811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1214: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 24—3 p.m.]
3768. Department’s 2572, December 4, my 3637, December 10. It is quite clear from conversations with the British Embassy that British [Page 667] Ambassador and the key members of his staff do not favor embarking on any drastic course of action to obtain a wolfram embargo or for that matter any of the other desiderata under current discussion with the Spanish Government, and in this they state they have the backing of London. The British seem now to be looking to Spain as a source of supply as well as an area of economic warfare.
It is equally clear here that the Spaniards have every intention of employing delaying tactics in the matter of a wolfram embargo and eventually these may include asking for far more than we could or would give. Whereas I believe our request for consideration of a wolfram embargo had to contain such alternate advantages to [apparent omission] with your authorization, embodied in my memorandum of November 181 since a prohibition of wolfram exports would create important political, revenue and economic repercussions, I do not believe that even a well balanced proposition will be voluntarily accepted by the Spaniards on its own merits as a far-sighted measure.
Germans have greatly improved their financial position in past few months and have decidedly increased their supplies to Spain of machinery, chemicals, coal, military equipment and miscellaneous products (Embassy’s 3637, December 10, 11 p.m.). In these circumstances it will be the policy of the Spanish Government to reap the benefit of wolfram boom so long as communications between Spain and German-controlled France are not effectively severed.
The value of a wolfram embargo depends upon its immediate and effective application. If we hope to force an early issue we must be prepared to offer definite and substantial compensatory advantages to the Spaniards and should these be rejected or a decision unduly delayed, to immediately employ economic pressure. In all probability Spaniards would accede to our demand under duress but benefits would be lessened by increased smuggling both over French border and, unless Portugal also embargoes wolfram exports, over Portuguese border.
I believe possible political and economic repercussions should be weighed against possible benefits we would derive from wolfram embargo.
In any case I consider that London and Washington must reach agreement on policy and procedure in this matter of joint concern and determine how far both Governments are prepared to go, (a) as regards offering compensating advantages to the Spaniards in return for wolfram embargo, and (b) as regards application of sanctions in event first offer fails. I shall continue to press Spanish Government for reply to request which I have already submitted and in this I feel sure I will be seconded by my British colleague. Meantime, [Page 668] I hope Washington and London will give consideration to whether we should be prepared at some point to apply economic sanctions2 with approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Repeated to London.
- See telegram No. 3398, November 18, 7 p.m., from the Ambassador in Spain, p. 656.↩
- In telegram No. 3822, December 29, 1943, the Ambassador in Spain reported that the British Ambassador told him that he would go along with the United States in pressing for a wolfram embargo, but that he was opposed to sanctions (852.79681/30).↩