Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

852.01/841: Airgram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

Madrid, July 29, 1943—noon.
[Received August 4—3 p.m.]

A–368. Supplementing my telegram No. 1969, July 29, 11 a.m.,²² I talked to General Franco an hour and forty minutes yesterday. Jordana was present.

I extended greetings on behalf of the President. I reiterated pledges we had made in connection with Spain and Spanish territory, and referred to rumors which our enemies were propagating to the effect that we were intriguing to restore the Monarchy or restore the Republic or to return exiled Spaniards to Spain and place them in power. I said of course such rumors were unfounded and that we were not concerned with internal affairs in Spain. We were concerned, however, with Spain’s foreign policy.

I said I felt that during my fifteen months in Spain there had been notable improvement in Spanish-American relations, especially in the economic and commercial field. This improvement had been slow, however, and had not reached the point it should. I was handicapped and Spain was handicapped by a widespread impression that the Spanish Government is sympathetic with the Axis and is not in fact neutral.

This circumstance is increasingly important now since it is very clear to us, and doubtless to Franco, that the United Nations are winning the war. Recent developments in Italy foreshadowed speedy capitulation. It was increasingly urgent that Spain clarify its international position and place it on the best possible basis.

Franco said he was not greatly surprised by the situation in Italy. He said that after we had occupied North Africa with very large forces, and knowing what he did about the low state of Italian morale, he was not surprised that Italy was in trouble. This did not mean that the war would end in the near future, however. Germany was still tough and morale there was excellent.

I said I was not prophesying when the war would end, but the offensive had now passed to the United Nations. He nodded agreement.

Returning to the main theme, I said there were three respects in which Spanish policy should be altered in order to give reassurance to the United Nations, and particularly to the United States and in Spain’s own interest:

(1) There was misunderstanding outside Spain concerning the meaning and possible effect of Spain’s non-belligerency. I said the Spanish Government should declare its neutrality in unequivocal terms.

Franco said that Spain’s policy was in fact neutral. He was determined Spain would not be involved in the war. Spain intended to be neutral. However, the word neutral had a disagreeable connotation. It implied indifference. Spain could not be indifferent to the struggle against Communism.

I observed that whatever meaning his Government might give to non-belligerence, it was not understood outside Spain. The foreign policy of any country had to take into account the effect of that policy outside its borders. Unfortunately Mussolini had used the same word in describing Italy’s policy just before it entered the war. Mussolini was now thoroughly discredited and German strength was diminishing. Spain’s continued non-belligerence was unfortunate from Spain’s point of view. Franco made no further reply to this.

(2) I believed the Foreign Office, under Jordana, was honestly endeavoring to carry out a policy of impartiality. However, that policy was continually being interfered with by other agencies, especially those directed and controlled by Falange. He asked which agencies. I said the Ministry of the Party, the Vicesecretariat of Popular Education, and the agencies having to do with the postal service and the local police.

Franco said Jordana had brought this to his attention several times. He asked whether the press had not improved. I said it had, but improvement was sporadic and there were many setbacks. It had not improved enough. I then gave him a resume concerning our difficulties in distributing informational material, and pointed out that while the German propaganda magazine, Signal, was freely sold in Spain, Selecciones could not be sold even though it had passed the Spanish censor.

Franco said this was important and he would look into the matter. He was anxious there should be no discrimination. He said of course one had to distinguish at times. Democratic propaganda was sometimes objectionable because it criticized the internal system in Spain. I pointed out that if it was interpreted in this manner it was because the internal system, that is Falange, was so pro-Axis.

He said he was glad I had called this matter to his attention.

(3) I then referred to the Blue Division. I quite understood Spain’s repugnance to Russian Communism and to any possible forceful intervention by Russia in Spanish affairs. Conversely, I could see no reason why Spain should attempt to intervene forcefully in Russian affairs. The Blue Division was doing exactly that. I pointed out there was no Blue Division when Germany and Russia were in practical alliance.

In 1941, however, after Germany had attacked Russia, the Spanish Government suddenly discovered that Russian Communism was a great menace. It looked to outsiders as though Spain were more interested in giving military support, even of a token nature, to Germany than in fighting Russian Communism.

Franco said Spain was not fighting Russia. The Blue Division was maintained only to show Spain’s horror of Communism and to resist Communism. The civil war in Spain developed into a war against Communism and Communist influence. While the civil war was still on, he was invited to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact.²³ Communism was so obviously a danger in Spain that he signed the Pact. He said I could not imagine his surprise when he learned Germany and Russia were drawing together. He protested to Hitler and also to Italy. He told Hitler he felt Germany was violating the Anti-comintern Pact. He also made overtures to England, France, and to the Vatican, to bring pressure to break up this association.

When the war broke out, Franco and all Spaniards were sympathetic with Poland. He foresaw Germany was allowing half of Poland to be appropriated by Russia. He made representations to the Vatican on behalf of Poland. Poland was overwhelmingly Catholic, and he felt he should do what he could to save it. He said that after the invasion of Poland he couldn’t think of joining Germany under any circumstances.

When Finland was attacked by Russia, Spain explored the possibility of sending a volunteer division to help the Finns. It was so soon after the civil war that Spain did not have the means, and the question of transport was difficult. Consequently, nothing was done.

He said there was a precedent for the Blue Division. A volunteer Spanish division fought on the French side during the first World War. Finally, when Germany and Russia fell out, it became practicable to send Spanish troops to the eastern front. He deemed it necessary to show Spain’s unchanging hostility to Communism, which it considered the greatest menace in the world.

He then asked me whether I thought Germany and Russia would get together. I said no, but added that if that should occur it would be an additional reason for Spain’s lining itself up with Britain and the United States.

I said I was very glad to have his explanation of the Blue Division. It was interesting and I knew my Government would be interested. I understood the motives prompting him historically. I felt, however, they did not square with the actual situation now. It is impossible to distinguish between the war against Communism and the war against Russia. Russia did not attack Germany. Germany attacked Russia. Germany obviously has imperialistic designs and hopes to annex large parts of Russia. Russia is fighting defensively. If Spain claimed Russia should not intervene in Spanish affairs, it could not justify Spain’s intervening in Russian affairs. The matter was pressing. German power was declining. If Spain was not careful it would be left in an embarrassing position. What would happen if Russia declared war on Spain? We all had to live with Russia now and in the future, and Spain should bear this in mind.

Franco admitted that the situation probably had changed somewhat. He said that, after all, however, there was a certain utility in having some Spanish officers on the eastern front. They furnish invaluable information about Germany and the eastern front.

I said I should think he could get this information through his Military Attaché in Berlin and not have to maintain a division on the eastern front for that purpose.

He said I had mentioned Spain’s delicate position now and when the peace should come. He would like to express his views.

There are three wars going on:

(1) That of England and the United States against Germany and Italy. In this war Spain is neutral. It is really benevolent toward us.

(2) The war in the Pacific. This, in many ways, is the most important of all, and from the long range viewpoint the most menacing. Japan is the great enemy. … He would like to cooperate with us against the Japanese, although the relative weakness of Spain would prevent any effective aid.

(3) The war against Communism. Unfortunately Europe is honeycombed with Communist impulses and there has been a great breakdown of civilization in Europe. A kind of decadence has come over the Continent. In Germany and Italy and all the occupied countries there are sizeable Communist groups, well-organized and ready to act and to strike. As the war goes on, and Russia gets the better of the Germans, the Russians will have all these groups ready at hand. It will then be easy for Russia to take over the Continent of Europe.

I asked if the United States and Britain would not be winning the war also. He said yes, but that while we put great enthusiasm into winning the war, we would both withdraw from the Continent when the war was won. We would not be in a position to turn about and attack Russia.

I said that while he could arbitrarily break down the war into three wars, this was not practical because the whole thing could not be disentangled. I said I had greater faith than he in Europe. There were no doubt groups of Communists in the countries he mentioned, but there were also large numbers of people in Germany as well as in the other countries who did not want any kind of totalitarianism. People were not obliged to choose between Naziism and Communism. The large moderate group composed of middle and upper-class persons, peasantry, army and navy officers, and many workers could be counted on to exert a modifying influence.

He said he hoped I was right. He still had his doubts.

I asked him how far he expected to get by saying: “Communism will triumph everywhere in Europe”? What could one Spanish division do to stop it? Wasn’t it better not to give Russia justification for attacking Spain? And shouldn’t Spain cooperate with the moderate powers in its own interest? He did not reply to this. I then said that it seemed to me Spain did not have to choose between Russia and Germany. Spain, after all, was an American country even more than a European country. He expressed emphatic agreement. I then spoke of Spain’s cultural and sentimental attachment to the Spanish American countries. He agreed. He said he recognized that the United States had certain economic, geographical and political ties with Spanish America. He feared my Government considered that Hispanidad was directed against the United States and had political ends.

I said my Government did not feel this, but that the popular press felt it and that there was justification for this feeling historically. I said that before Jordana became Foreign Minister an effort was being made to use Hispanidad in this manner. He said if it ever had been used that way, it had been stopped long since. He referred again to our important relations with Spanish America and said that he hoped we would have increasingly close relations also with Spain. Spanish ties with Latin America are purely cultural and sentimental. There was no reason why we all couldn’t work together. He said he pictured it as a triangle in which we all would have mutually helpful relations. He knew the United States had no idea of extending political control over Spanish America and neither did Spain. He regarded Spain and the Spanish American countries as constituting a sentimental federation.

I said that reinforced what I had been telling him. Throughout Spanish America there was great repugnance for the German imperialism of Hitler. It seemed to me that Spain, in its desire for solidarity with Spanish America, could find an added important reason for ceasing in any way to favor the Axis or to appear to favor it. Public opinion in Spanish America was a very important consideration to Spain. I said that, in addition, the overwhelming majority of persons in Spain itself were not pro-German. He thought this was correct. He said, of course, there are sentimental ties with Germany for assistance given during the civil war. This debt, of course, had long since been paid.

I said I hoped that as we approached the end of the war Spain would find itself in full cooperation with the United Nations.

I thanked him for receiving me and expressed appreciation of his explanation of Spanish policy, and said it would be of interest to my Government. He thanked me and said he had profited by my exposition. He said he would give all the matters I had mentioned his most earnest attention. He asked me to convey to President Roosevelt his highest regards. He has the greatest esteem for him and considers him a great leader. The interview was pleasant and unusually friendly.

Hayes

22. Not printed; it gave an abridged account of the conversation reported in this airgram (852.01/837).
23. For text of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 153. For additional secret agreement, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1943, series D, vol. i (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 734, footnote 2a.