While the relative freedom with which German agencies and pro-German
elements in the Falange have been allowed to operate in Spain has not, I
think, had the effect of fostering pro-Axis sentiments in Spain at
large, but, on the other hand, has synchronized with a growing
friendship and dependence on the democracies, I believe nevertheless
that the impression created abroad that Spain is a partisan of the Axis
has had considerable propaganda value to the Axis, and that our general
position would be greatly improved if the Spanish Government should take
steps to counteract this impression. It has been this Embassy’s belief,
and likewise the belief of the British Embassy and of many sincere
friends whom we have in the Spanish Government, that it would have been
a mistake to make an issue of the matter up to now, particularly since,
as pointed out in the memorandum, the Germans have tended to overplay
their hand and to produce a reaction within Spain fundamentally
favorable to us.,
As events progress, and as and when our military position further
improves, it may be in our interest, however, to make an issue with the
Spanish Government. In the enclosed memorandum the Embassy has
endeavored to outline some results which might possibly follow.
I do not recommend that this plan be put into effect today, and it may be
that changing circumstances will make it unnecessary or undesirable ever
to carry it into effect. However, I have begun to lay the basis for it
if and when it should appear desirable (see my despatch No. 746 of March
29, 1943). I would assume, of course, that no such plan would be
undertaken without the Embassy’s prior consent and that of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Like everything else with which the Embassy occupies itself now, the plan
envisages the possibility of obtaining additional military advantages to
us in Spain, and, of course, it should be studied with that objective in
mind.
I have shown the plan to Colonel Hohenthal, who approves it as a basis
for study and for possible action if events should appear to make action
of the kind suggested desirable.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain
(Hayes)
to the Secretary of
State
It is rumored in Madrid that Count von der Schulenburg, thoroughgoing
German Nazi, who came to Madrid as representative of Hitler
[Page 604]
to Ambassador von Moltke’s
funeral, will be named Ambassador to Spain to succeed von Moltke. If
this is true, we may anticipate strengthened Nazi pressure on Spain
in the future, if not to bring Spain into the war or to obtain
military facilities from Spain, then at least to secure minor favors
from Spain and to limit Spain’s concessions to the democracies.
Whether or not von der Schulenburg is named Ambassador it is still
likely that the above will be Germany’s attitude toward Spain during
ensuing months.
We have already reported to the Department that Franco is giving
indications that he is trying to establish a basis for maintaining
himself in power indefinitely. The press has given prominence to a
long lecture by a Madrid University professor endeavoring to
demonstrate that “Caudillaje”, the present “system of government” in
Spain, is itself a legitimate system, having roots in Spanish
“reason” and tradition, and that it differs no less from Naziism and
Fascism than from democracy (Embassy’s despatch No. 762, April 2,
194317). Franco
himself told the Cortes that the legitimacy of his power was that
which pertained to one who had rescued a society (Embassy’s despatch
No. 694, March 20, 194317).
There is little doubt that when Franco was named by a group of
generals Chief of Government of the Spanish State while the civil
war was still going on, it was in no one’s mind that he would
convert himself into Chief of State for life or that a new form of
government was in the making in Spain, or that its chief bulwark
would be a pro-German “Falange”. It was generally accepted that the
civil war would end in restoration of the Monarchy, and “Viva el
Rey” was a battle cry of the Nationalist armies.
General Franco, however, with what he probably considered rare
political sense, and undoubtedly encouraged by the then German
Ambassador, made a national hero out of José Antonio Primo de Rivera
and fostered the latter’s relatively small “Falange” and built it up
as the sole political party in Spain. Falange is probably now the
only organization in Spain which would whole-heartedly support
Franco in any effort to perpetuate himself in power or to perpetuate
the present political system.
Falange has never been really popular in Spain, either with the Army,
which saw in it a possible rival with its semi-military
organization, or with the Spanish people, little addicted to
totalitarianism and regimentation.
The outbreak of the present world war gave Franco a perhaps
unexpected opportunity to consolidate himself in power. Spain was
broken economically and divided politically as a result of three
years
[Page 605]
of bitter civil war,
and the possibility that Spain might become involved in the world
war induced nearly all sectors of the Spanish population to support
Franco in the hope that some order might be brought out of the
existing chaos and that Spain might be spared entry into the
international conflict.
From the beginning, Franco identified himself closely with the Axis
powers, both as a means of strengthening his own position in Spain
and as insurance against Spain’s being invaded. The Spanish people
soon sensed that with all his apparent friendliness to the Axis
General Franco was actually endeavoring to keep out of the war. This
policy was heartily supported by the Spanish people.
Yet Spain, under Franco and the Falange, became a fertile field for
Axis agents and Axis propaganda. The Germans, with practically
complete freedom in the propaganda field, overplayed their hand, and
as the Nazi menace revealed itself to the world there was a
revulsion of public opinion in Catholic Spain which was directed not
only against the Nazis, but against their artificial counterpart in
Spain, Falange. This revulsion erased to a large extent the
gratitude of Nationalists for the military help received during the
civil war from Germany and Italy, which, of course, had been in
large part responsible for the success of the Nationalist
Movement.
As time has gone on, therefore, Franco, who has continued to be
pro-Axis in his public statements, and Falange, which has continued
to identify itself ideologically and sentimentally with the Axis,
have steadily lost popular favor. This has been a progressive
phenomenon although it has never been translated into effective
action against the regime because (1) Franco’s policy of staying out
of the war has continued to receive general support; (2) economic
conditions within the country have slowly but steadily improved; (3)
close police supervision and the feeling that any disturbance in the
domestic political situation might still result in German
intervention and possible Spanish involvement in the war have
continued to discourage opposition elements from getting
together.
Now, as Allied military prospects improve, and particularly when the
Axis is thrown out of Africa, it is logical that Spanish
determination to resist Axis aggression will be reinforced. The
Government itself has officially expressed such determination, the
Spanish public is aware of our own guarantees, and it would be
dangerous under the best circumstances for the Government to recede
from its pledge to us. Furthermore, as our military plans develop
and prosper, the danger of German aggression will decrease, or at
least will appear to the Spaniards to decrease. In fact, the
possibility of German invasion is already discounted by a majority
of Spaniards.
[Page 606]
As German ability to supply Spain with products Spain must import
from abroad decreases—and it is steadily decreasing—our own ability
to trade with Spain, and particularly our ability to provide Spain
with petroleum products18 vitally needed in
Spanish industry, agriculture and transportation, constitutes an
increasingly powerful weapon in our hands. It is probably a more
powerful weapon than any Germany can use against Spain, especially
since German invasion in the face of probable Spanish resistance
will involve grave military risks for the Germans, and German
submarine warfare against Spanish shipping, which Germany has used
as an active weapon in the past, can be limited in its effectiveness
by convoying once the Spaniards feel safe to engage in such
practice.
Because of our superior ability to trade with Spain, and our
effective economic program, we have built up in Spain an economic
dependence on us which constitutes a weapon in our hands waiting
only to be used at the proper time. Meanwhile, as a result of past
pro-Axis utterances of General Franco and of his continuing
tolerance of the pro-Axis Falange, we have a number of legitimate
complaints against Spain which we can press at the proper moment.
These include the pro-Axis partisanship of the government-controlled
Spanish press, radio and newsreels, other facilities given to the
Axis in the Spanish propaganda field, Falange interference with our
own informational activities in Spain, and, if we care to use it,
the presence on the Eastern front of a Spanish volunteer division
actively fighting the Russians.
It is recommended that we bear in mind the desirability at the proper time of exerting pressure on
the Spanish Government to remove all such obvious discriminations
against us. Such pressure may succeed, in which case we shall have
made a net gain and shall have a fuller field for activities of all
kinds in Spain.
On the other hand, it is possible that the Spanish Government, in the
face of Falange and German pressure which it is anticipated will be
exerted on Spain, may persist in its discriminations against us. In
that event, we may decide to slow up, or even to interrupt,
deliveries of American products, including petroleum, to Spain. We
might simultaneously intensify our propaganda in Spain and complain
publicly against the pro-Axis policies of the Spanish Government so
that it would become apparent that there was a relationship between
those policies and the reduction in Spanish-American trade.
Franco would in that event be in an extremely weak position. It would
probably be too late for him to appeal for help from the Axis. The
popular will to resist Axis interference, which has been cultivated
[Page 607]
by the Government,
itself, would be too strong, and he could not expect support from
the Army.
The Spanish people, already anti-Axis in their feeling, would be
aware, as in fact they are aware already, that we had real
grievances against Spain, and there is a good chance that the odium
for the economic crisis which would ensue in Spain would fall on
General Franco, who is held to be personally responsible for the
pro-Axis attitude of the Spanish Government.
The desire to overcome the economic crisis, which would in itself
threaten to bring about popular revolt in Spain, might be the factor
needed to bring the diverse anti-Franco and anti-Falange groups in
Spain together. The Army, with monarchist support, might carry out a
coup which would restore the Monarchy. If this opportunity were
missed, the possibility of mass rebellion would become imminent.
A revolt against the present regime would be a revolt against the
Axis because of the regime’s close identification with it. As
between the Axis and ourselves we would be in a favored position if
we were able to take military advantage of our opportunity. If the
Axis entered Spain we might enter also, without being guilty of
committing an aggression. We would, in that event, have a ready-made
second front without in any way repudiating our pledges to
Spain.
Portugal would most probably be in a mood to accept our military aid,
and both the Portuguese and Spanish islands in the Atlantic would
become available for use by us as bases.
In creating the conditions for these developments we could not be
accused of having committed an aggression against Spain because we
have no obligation to continue our economic relations with Spain in
the face of the pro-Axis attitude of many agencies of the Spanish
Government. In fact, this attitude deprives Spain of any just claim
to continued treatment as a neutral and we have a perfect right to
reduce or suspend our trade with Spain so long as these Spanish
agencies are allowed to persist in their pro-Axis partisanship.
