811.34553B/36: Telegram
The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:12 p.m.]
2911. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and Matthews. The following detailed comments are added with respect to Kennan’s last interview with Salazar, as reported in my 2906, December 2, noon;
[Page 574]1. Salazar is definitely agreed to our using Terceira to the full under any formula which will reconcile such use with the existing Anglo-Portuguese Agreement, but he wants us to tell him frankly what that formula will be. A nominal marking of the planes as British would be quite sufficient, in Salazar’s view. We would, of course, have to abide by restrictions now applicable to British with respect to flights over Portuguese territorial waters, approaches, et cetera. Salazar expressed particular concern that we should consider this as a facility extended to us by Portugal and not by the British.
Kennan informed him of the plans for participation of our forces in antisubmarine patrol work at Terceira. He showed no surprise at this and expressed no objection but pointed out that it must be subject to the general rule that a formula be found to reconcile the practice with the British agreement.
2. He agreed to examine carefully the question of the construction and use by American forces of a new airport on Santa Maria Island. While he did not specifically say so, it was clear that this examination would be undertaken in a benevolent spirit. He could not see his way clear to conceding these facilities to us outright at this time. He says that the German Minister has been after him repeatedly with all sorts of questions about the possibility of the facilities in the Azores being used by the Americans; and German curiosity in this respect has been so keen that he suspects the question may represent a keystone of German policy with regard to Portugal.
For this reason Salazar’s mind is working more along lines of our constructing an airfield at this time for the Portuguese account on understanding that if, at time the construction is finished, we could show that we and British have need for facilities greater than those accorded in the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement and that risk to Portugal in granting further facilities has declined, he would then make field available to the British under article VIII of existing Anglo-Portuguese Agreement and permit our use of it just as in the case of Lagens and Horta. If it then happened that the field was used 95 per cent by our forces he would presumably not object as long as some formula were observed which would permit him as in case of Terceira to deny officially to the Germans that he had granted any special facilities to the “United States in the islands.
The above was not yet a specific proposal but merely a suggestion on which he did not repudiate and which he is revolving in his mind.
The interpretation of article VIII of the British Agreement is Salazar’s own, and not, according to the British Ambassador, the result of an understanding with the British. Salazar said that he had himself ascertained since last interviewed that Flores was utterly [Page 575] unsuitable for aviation. He did not deny advantages of Santa Maria. He said if our views about Santa Maria were to change in the next few days or if there were anything additional that we specifically wanted along these lines, we should let him know at once; which leads us to believe that he expects to give very serious consideration to this suggestion.
3. Salazar is not in a position to grant any facilities at this time on Island of São Miguel. Ponta Delgada, he points out, is not only the center of Portuguese administration but it is the only port left to Portuguese in islands. It has become matter of pride with Portuguese Navy to retain at least one base of operations which they can call their own in that area. Kennan pointed out our need for a port with an airfield nearby which could be used for grounding carrier based planes and suggested perhaps some informal arrangements might be made for use of Eibode Peixe field for this purpose. Salazar was doubtful about this and pointed out that it had been agreed with the British that fighter forces stationed in the islands would be Portuguese and that Eibode Peixe field had been reserved for those forces. He stated that the British naval authorities and presumably ours as well were under a misapprehension with respect to the capacity and potentialities of Horta. He believed that we could have everything there which we might require in the way of facilities for such aircraft. If we wished to station American tile [mercantile?] tanker and repair ship there for example that could be arranged. We propose to endeavor to arrange for conferences between our naval experts and Portuguese officials for further clarification of these questions.
4. Salazar was unwilling to contemplate any action with respect to bases in the Azores on hypothesis of future co-belligerency with us against Japan. He felt instinctively that some agreement existed between Germans and Japanese about Timor and was obviously worried lest his relations with Germany be complicated by the Timor situation. He is most anxious to have a reply to his inquiries concerning participation of Portuguese forces in the liberation of Timor (see my 2883, November 2919) and I think that it would pay us to be helpful here.
5. In view of the above I think that we should now take the following action:
- (a)
- Our military authorities should agree with the British on the exact formula to be adopted to cover the use of Lagens field by our aircraft. This formula should then be communicated to me for further communication to Portuguese Government.
- (b)
- A preliminary proposal should at once be drawn up for the construction of an airport on Santa Maria and this proposal should be communicated to me for use in further conversations. It should [Page 576] be expressed in broad but succinct terms, leaving details for a later agreement. It should contain provision for immediate surveying of the island by our technicians. It should assure us most-favored-nation treatment with respect to later use for commercial aviation et cetera. It is my thought that this preliminary proposal could perhaps be embodied in a preliminary exchange of notes with Portuguese Government which would permit us to proceed at once to the surveying of the field and to technical planning. The actual construction contract could be left for a later date.
By way of comment on the general situation, I may say the following:
We may disagree with Salazar on the extent of the danger from Germany, which he probably thinks of in terms of security of Portuguese shipping rather than of invasion or of aerial bombardment; but we must recognize that if it is our desire that Portugal remain neutral—and the British specifically signified this in their agreement—then we must respect Salazar’s desire to avoid complications with Germany. This being so, I think the length to which Salazar has gone constitutes considerable progress and that we should make the most of it. I should particularly appreciate being informed as to exact extent to which our Military and Naval authorities expect to do this.
- Not printed.↩