811.34553B/29: Telegram
The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
Lisbon, November
24, 1943—8 p.m.
[Received 11:38 p.m.]
[Received 11:38 p.m.]
2854. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Matthews. I should like to add following comments on Kennan’s interview with Salazar, as reported in my 2839, November 23, 10 p.m., and the resulting situation:
- 1.
- The British Minister is endeavoring to see the Portuguese this evening in order to support our requests. He expects to use the “Friends of Friends” thought and to express the earnest hope of his Government that the Portuguese should go along with us. He will invite their attention to a document of last June in which British informed them that the facilities they were then seeking would be needed for ferrying of aircraft to the various theaters of war. He will also say that prompt and favorable action on our request would make it much easier for British to induce us to provide supplies for Portugal envisaged in the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement.
- 2.
- In addition to support of the British here, I think it would be helpful if Ambassador Winant were to talk with Portuguese Ambassador in London and to tell him quite frankly of the great urgency and importance of this problem to us, and of advisability of prompt action, in Portuguese interests. If Winant could do this informally it would come with better grace than if it is said direct to Salazar here, where in the circumstances, it might sound like a threat.
- 3.
- I must invite attention particularly to Salazar’s remark about Timor. In the end the Timor situation may have a decisive bearing on Portuguese attitude. One way out of Salazar’s dilemma might be for us to ask him to enter war against Japan, though not against Germany, and to give us the facilities and consequences of this move. When the Azores agreement was made known to Germans they showed themselves more concerned about Portuguese relations with Japan than about facilities in the islands, and British have impression that Germans have promised Japanese to take same action if Japanese-Portuguese relations were disrupted. For this reason Salazar would probably hesitate to break with the Japanese just now.
- 4.
- We must remember that even if we can once overcome the qualms of principle in Dr. Salazar’s mind we will still have to face the usual Portuguese proclivity for horse trading over details.
- 5.
- Salazar showed himself sceptical as to whether our military potential in the European theater was yet adequate to the winning of the war. He said that at present in his opinion the only ‘real military force on our side in Europe was that of the Russians. This is important because it influences his estimate of our ability to defend the peninsula in case of German military action against Portugal.
- 6.
- The military and naval representatives here including the experts who have arrived for this purpose have been fully informed as to the conference with Salazar and are wiring their conclusions. Colonel Solborg the Military Attaché is leaving for Washington tonight. I would appreciate it if the Department would ask the War Department to see that he is kept informed of all developments here during his period of consultation in Washington and is given opportunity to state his views on these questions, as he has been constantly in contact with Portuguese military authorities in recent weeks.
- 7.
- I hope that instructions will be given to the survey group now in the Azores to keep this Legation posted currently as to results of their investigations. This can probably be done thru the services which they represent.
- 8.
- Kennan has offered to transmit Salazar’s reply16 to the President’s communication17 but we do not yet know whether Salazar intends to take advantage of this offer.
Norweb