811.34553B/23: Telegram
The Chargé in Portugal (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3 p.m.]
2819. For Under Secretary and Matthews. In answer to the points raised in Department’s 2108, November 20, it is my plan first to ask Salazar to confirm that Portuguese Government has no objection to use by our forces of Horta and Terceira facilities or to the participation of our engineering units in the improvement of these facilities.
Having once obtained these assurances which should make it possible for us to proceed forthwith to the improvement and use of Terceira field and to the temporary use of Horta for repairs and refueling I intend at the same interview to sound Salazar out informally on the desires of our Army and Navy for further facilities. In this I shall be guided by my original instruction, Department’s 1798, October 16; and in view of failure of our military and naval authorities to agree on priorities among their respective desires I expect to place them all before Salazar in an informal and exploratory manner.
As far as the British are concerned I was given clearly to understand in Washington that it was the wish of our military and naval authorities that we should proceed with our program independently regardless of extent to which British might be prepared to support us. For this reason I am somewhat at a loss to understand instruction under reference.
In deference to the wish so strongly expressed by the Secretary of War9 and General Arnold10 that I should not consult with my British colleague before seeing Salazar I avoided seeing him as long as was decently possible after my return. In view of the delay in arranging the appointment with Salazar, however, a time was bound to come when I could no longer refuse without distinct discourtesy to see the British Ambassador. Accordingly I met him on Friday afternoon11 at his request and outlined to him the plan which I have described above.
I must reiterate that I enter into these conversations with misgivings in view of our failure to reach complete agreement with the British in advance as to our joint military and strategic requirements. I am in a particularly poor position to demonstrate that our Navy needs a separate air field to participate in submarine patrolling when I have no clear evidence that the British, who I understand bear the [Page 567] strategic responsibility for these operations in that particular sector, have ever recognized the need for our participation in this work in the Azores area much less our need for a separate field for this purpose.
Altogether, before entering on these discussions, I should like to record once more the view which I expressed repeatedly to our military and naval authorities at home that nothing could better facilitate the pending conversations with the Portuguese than complete agreement in the Combined Chiefs over those objectives which military necessity obliges us to seek.
I hope that the interview with Salazar will take place this evening.