811.34553B/16: Telegram
The Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:30 p.m.]
2599. For the Under Secretary and Matthews. For Kennan.5 As a result of a previous conversation of which you have knowledge [Page 563] between Solborg6 and Carvalhaes, the Under Secretary for War7 yesterday invited Solborg to call upon him for the first time. The following is a brief resume of the conversation: Carvalhaes stated that the substance of Solborg’s earlier conversation with him had been conveyed to Salazar who reacted favorably and consequently requested the Under Secretary to have this talk with Solborg. The conversation began with a somewhat extended outline of Portugal’s early history and the background of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance which was based primarily upon geographical considerations (here the Under Secretary pointed out in support of this thesis that relations with Britain had not always been of the best especially during the last war when Portuguese troops were not particularly well treated in the field, et cetera). It was, of course, impossible to refuse Britain’s request for facilities in the Azores under the terms of this Alliance. He then stated that the geographical situation in the modern world had been modified owing to astonishing advances in transportation, communications, modern thought and other factors in such a way as to make it comprehensible and logical that the United States should be brought closer to Portugal. “We are not unmindful of this fact” he said.
He emphasized, however, that Portugal’s primary doctrine was that of strict neutrality which it was determined to preserve under all conditions.
Solborg then pointed out that the United States and Britain were fighting this war as allies and he wished to ask the Under Secretary whether he did not feel that as an ally of Portugal’s ally—“Friends of Friends” so to speak—the United States might not expect to enjoy a more favored position vis-á-vis Portugal than say enemies of Portugal’s ally. The Under Secretary admitted that within certain limitations such was undoubtedly the case. For instance, he continued, recognizing the ever growing needs of the United States in connection with the prosecution of the war, Portugal would favorably envisage, provided it remained both a pattern of the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement, to accord to the United States similar facilities, as for example, in connection with convoys.
Solborg signified his assent to the foregoing and the subject was pursued no further, the conversation turning on other matters chiefly in connection with the desirability of an improvement in commercial relations in the postwar world.
These then are the highlights of the conversations and the points I have touched upon have been carefully checked with Solborg as to their accuracy.
[Page 564]In conveying the foregoing to you I am not unmindful of the difficulty of evaluating properly at such a distance the true import of this conversation. I am, however, persuaded that we would be on safe ground in concluding that the Under Secretary, probably reflecting Salazar’s thoughts, wished to create the impression that he has at least an open mind in respect to an approach on the question of granting certain facilities to us. Neither Solborg nor myself have the impression that there was anything in the Under Secretary’s statements which would justify the conclusion that we would necessarily be held within the precise limits of the British agreement.