Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)⁷⁰

Washington, October 6, 1943.

376. To Former Naval Person. I have just received the following recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:⁷¹

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to convey to you their serious concern regarding the situation which has developed with respect to the use of the Azores.

The importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be over-emphasized. Briefly summarized, it represents:

a. Potential saving over the 6 months period (November 1943–April 1944) of approximately 51 million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month’s consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.

b. Potential saving in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul.

c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area where they are so urgently needed.

d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty elsewhere.

This gasoline consumption required by the longer southern route is at the direct expense of the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Program which has just been temporarily curtailed due to fuel shortage. Unless immediate action is taken to effect a saving, the flow of replacement combat crews to theaters of operation will soon be reduced. Alternatively, the reserve levels of gasoline now maintained in theaters of operations will have to be lowered.

The present British-Portuguese agreement covering facilities in the islands does not provide facilities for air transport and air ferrying operations. We have advised the British Chiefs of Staff of our requirements and of additional steps which we feel should be taken, but we have little confidence that the British will provide facilities for a central Atlantic air route in time to be of value to the Overlord build-up during the coming winter months.

We consider this matter to be so serious that we are suggesting that you bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister, emphasizing the grave implications of delay in securing facilities for air ferrying and air transport operations. Our suggestion is that a specific request be made to the Prime Minister to make Lagens Field, Terceira, available for air transport and air ferrying purposes immediately following our initial entry and that further negotiations with the Portuguese be instituted in which the United States will participate with Great Britain to secure the additional facilities so urgently required.”

I agree that this is a very important matter.

Roosevelt

70. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
71. The Department of Defense has supplied information that the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter quoted by the President was apparently a draft, since on October 6, 1943, the Joint Staff Planners had not yet completed their work of preparing the letter for submission to the JCS. The version offered for JCS consideration differed only in a few phrases from the text already used by the President. Since Admiral Leahy advised the JCS that the President had already-dispatched a message in this sense to the Prime Minister, the JCS never formally completed the action of approving the letter and sending it to the President.