741.53/118: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

4285. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My telegram No. 4228, June 26, midnight. The Prime Minister desires that the following message be transmitted to the President:

  • “1. We have now received the Portuguese reply about Lifebelt.54 This stated that the Portuguese are ready in principle to accord us the facilities we require. The consequences of this acceptance may, however, be so serious for Portugal and the life of her people that the actual use of the facilities accorded in principle must be preceded by the previous examination by the two Governments of the political, military and economic considerations involved.
  • 2. The reply also takes note of our undertaking that at the close of hostilities British troops would be withdrawn from Bracken, and of the assurances concerning the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies. In this connection the Portuguese Government state that they will be glad to receive a similar [Page 535] guarantee from the Government of the United States which we had indicated would be forthcoming. I hope you will be able to authorize me to inform the Portuguese Government that in the event of a satisfactory agreement being reached the United States Government are willing to associate themselves with the assurances already given by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.
  • 3. In the course of discussion with His Majesty’s Ambassador, Dr. Salazar stated that having responded to our appeal he was willing to face the consequences whatever they might be, but that, in view of the present state of Portuguese defences, he would prefer that Portugal should not be drawn in as an active belligerent if that could be avoided. He hoped that any staff talks would be conducted with that consideration in mind. He also stated that Portuguese susceptibilities would not admit of the cession of bases under any form of lease, and that he would probably desire Portuguese forces to remain in a defensive capacity. These views are in accordance with our own.
  • 4. Arising out of this, Dr. Salazar said that under no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than British, except perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the war. He would, however, not object to fuelling facilities being given to warships and merchant vessels of the U.S.A. and of other United Nations, as convoy arrangements would obviously make it inconvenient to restrict such facilities only to the British. In view of the fact that the approach to the Portuguese was made on the basis of the treaties of alliance, I hope you will agree that we should conclude an agreement with the Portuguese on the lines desired by Dr. Salazar. I think that at a later stage, if it became necessary, it should be possible to secure Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by the forces of other of the United Nations. In this connection, Harriman gave me a message on June 24 that you thought it would be useful if Brazil could be associated with Lifebelt and perhaps station troops in Bracken. I am sure that in view of the statements made to our Ambassador at Lisbon by Dr. Salazar, it would be very difficult to secure Portuguese consent to such a proposal, and that it would jeopardize the success of the negotiations if we were to try to persuade them to accept other than British forces. I should not, therefore, like to have to raise this matter with the Portuguese at this time.
  • We have now proposed to Dr. Salazar that immediate discussions should be opened between experts on both sides, and our delegation will leave for Lisbon very soon.”

Winant
  1. Code name for operations against Portuguese Atlantic islands. For indications of the attitudes of Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Eden, the British War Cabinet, the British Chiefs of Staff, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the necessity of the Allies obtaining use of the Azores, see Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, p. 378; Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1948–1941, in the series United States Army in World War II: The War Department (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 134; and Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There, pp. 140 and 191.