851.01/1023: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

1349. I called on Mr. Eden this afternoon and discussed with him the question of General de Gaulle’s recent statements along the lines [Page 64] of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 1117, February 19, 7 p.m. I read to him de Gaulle’s remarks and said that you naturally found some inconsistency in the fact that the General expressing those views should be supported by British funds on the basis of his contribution to the United Nations cause in defeating the Axis.

Mr. Eden said he quite understood your feelings. De Gaulle had frequently said worse things to him and just a few days ago had spent an hour and a half telling him all the mistakes of his, Eden’s, French policy over the past 2 years.… Eden went on to say that he is now faced with a practical problem of whether to let de Gaulle take his proposed trip (please see last paragraph my telegram No. 1268, February 18, 11 p.m.) and probably stir up further trouble in Syria as he did the last time and possibly in Madagascar and Djibouti, or whether to take the drastic step of refusing to let him go. (I learn from another source that the Prime Minister sent instructions several days ago to Cadogan to tell de Gaulle he could not leave. Cadogan has, however, been laid up with influenza and the message has not been delivered. Eden feels that such a veto might do more harm than good at this time. He learned today of General Eisenhower’s and Giraud’s willingness to meet de Gaulle in North Africa but the question is still undecided.)

Eden said that he thought that Capitant’s visit (my telegram No. 1268, February 18, and 1292, February 19, 8 p.m.92) and the influence of Massigli (my telegram No. 1021, February 8, 9 p.m.93) have brought about an improvement in the atmosphere and I said that I agreed. I added that I thought an equally important factor responsible for the better behaviour of Carlton Gardens was the Prime Minister’s indication that failure on de Gaulle’s part to make progress toward agreement with Giraud might make it difficult for the British Government to renew its credits. He said, with a smile, that he had not been told of this move but agreed that the intimation would be effective at least with a number of the General’s advisers.

I then reminded him that de Gaulle’s attitude toward the American Government and its policy toward France over the past 2 years had been one of definite hostility, that he had lost no opportunity to incite our press, which was necessarily ignorant of the many factors involved, to attack our Government and our policy, and that many of the people with whom he had surrounded himself led us seriously to doubt whether he is in fact the Messiah that the French people will choose for the rebuilding of their country when its liberation comes. Mr. Eden said he quite understands your feeling and that he himself has serious doubts of de Gaulle’s stability—though apparently not of his sincerity. (He said the President had struck it when he mentioned [Page 65] the strange light in de Gaulle’s eye after their Casablanca meeting. Incidentally, he added, “I don’t believe de Gaulle yet realizes the mistake he made in delaying his departure for Casablanca 2 days.”) In conclusion he said he looked forward eagerly to the opportunity of talking over with you personally the whole question of our respective policies toward France.

Matthews
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