740.00112 European War 1939/9453: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

6862. For EWD.21 Reference Embassy’s despatch 11,467 of October 2. Without knowing what special justifications may exist, Department and FEA22 are at a loss to understand why you and Foot gave your assent to the order on credit of motors and cement from Sweden to rebuild the Norsk Hydro nitrogen plant damaged by our recent bombing raid. Our reasons for strongly disapproving this action are as follows:

1.
Norsk Hydro is completely under the control of the German Government. Its activities are directed by I. G. Farben,23 which owns 80 percent of the stock.
2.
Contrary to the statement in your despatch, only a relatively small portion of the total fertilizer production of Norsk Hydro remains in Norway. During 1942–43, of a total production of 64,700 tons of fertilizer, only 18,000 tons were for Norway, while Denmark was to receive 27,000 tons, Sweden 15,500 tons and Finland 4,200 tons. Even if all the nitrates were used in Norway, blockade principles would require refusal of the proposed export.
3.
One of our primary objectives in the Swedish negotiations was to diminish Swedish imports from enemy territory so as to reduce Sweden’s exports. Therefore, it is to our interest to eliminate so far as possible the nitrates exports from Norway to Sweden which in 1942 were valued at over 90 million kronor.
4.
In addition to fertilizer the Norsk Hydro plant manufactures nitric acid, sulphuric acid, soda ash, heavy water, and other strategic industrial chemicals. The heavy water is entirely exported to Germany for highly secret military uses.
5.
Since the power installations of Norsk Hydro supply electricity to aluminum and other plants in the same region, there is the danger that these Swedish supplies will be used to restore production at other bombed factories. This danger is increased because we have not obtained an exact description of the goods to be exported or the damage done.
6.
Credits granted by Swedish banks for exports to Norway are contrary to the new War Trade Agreement24 and we feel it is highly undesirable to weaken this provision of the agreement by exceptions of this kind. This is particularly important in our view because the Swedes did not approach us on this matter, thereby presumably indicating that they felt there was no ground for making an exception in this case.
7.
In any case, the partial destruction of the nitrogen plant according to MEW’s25 statement should not affect the Norwegian food supply for the coming year. In 12 months time the military situation will more likely have so changed that it may well be possible to relieve the Norwegians.
8.
Aside from the foregoing reasons which clearly indicate the Norsk Hydro plant is a legitimate target for our air force, it seems to us that as a matter of general principle and in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, civilian agencies of the Government should not undertake any measures designed to repair damages inflicted by our forces on industrial plants in enemy territory.

Under these circumstances please inform MEW at the earliest opportunity that we strongly disapprove the proposed exports and the proposed credit whether guaranteed or not. It is apparent that under the new War Trade Agreement we have the clear right to disapprove the credit. Furthermore, in the letter of September 29 from the MEW to the British Mission in Stockholm it was stated that acquiescence to the credit was given without prejudice to our decision on the export license. Accordingly, the provisional agreement to the credit can now be withdrawn in view of this Government’s opposition. Our position should be made clear as soon as possible to the Swedish Government and to the Swedish banks which otherwise might grant the credit on the basis of your conditional approval. In this connection, moreover, the banks should be reminded that under the terms of the new Agreement such credits are prohibited unless the full consent of the British and American Governments is obtained by the Swedish Government in advance.

It is also suggested that the Norwegian Government in Exile be informed regarding our attitude, and advised that we could not concur in the use of their funds held in Stockholm in any manner to effect a direct or indirect purchase. For your information, if Norsk Hydro attempts to purchase the goods without a credit, we might at the appropriate time point out to the Swedes that we consider the proposed export of cement and motors, even if within the ceilings, highly deleterious to our interests because repair of damages done by our air forces would be facilitated.

We would appreciate your informing us why we were not advised by cable of a matter of this importance rather than by a despatch which arrived nearly one month after assent to the Norwegian proposal had been given in London.

For information about Norsk Hydro, we suggest that you consult a report prepared in the London office of OSS26 dated January 29, 1943, entitled “Norwegian Nitrogen Industry”.

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Please inform Department and FEA of the remedial action MEW and the Embassy intend to take.

Stettinius
  1. Economic Warfare Division in the Embassy at London.
  2. Foreign Economic Administration.
  3. A German Chemical Combine.
  4. For text of the War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, see note verbale of September 23, 1943, p. 806.
  5. Ministry of Economic Warfare.
  6. Office of Strategic Services.