865.01/1005a
Count Carlo Sforza to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)18
Dear Mr. Berle: You may be sure that—as you cabled me on or about November 2319—I did my best “to be responsive to the popular will, while supporting fully the Italian military effort and Marshal Badoglio as its responsible head.” I knew the heavy mistakes of Badoglio in the fateful months of August and September, after Mussolini’s fall, but I knew also (a) that the responsibility of these tragic errors rested with the King, whom I had, with the whole Italian nation, openly rejected, as I told Mr. Hull and you and—even more forcefully—to Mr. Churchill since he had the most wrong information about the King’s position; (b) that just because we had to eliminate a traitor king it was advisable not to increase the list of eliminations and ostracisms. Badoglio had been a gallant leader in the past and I hoped that I might help him, since he was “in power”, to become the creator of an immediate Italian military effort.
You know that trying to keep alive the principle of a liberal monarchy I suggested the abdication of the King and proclamation of his innocent grandson as King with Badoglio as Regent or—if the King liked it better—with a decent non-Fascist prince. Badoglio entered enthusiastically into my views. He told me that the King hated him just as he despised the republicans, accepted my scheme as a compromise in order to go on, now, only with the war. But suddenly—I do not know why—Badoglio changed and began saying the contrary of what he had confided to me and my friends. I’ll tell [Page 439] you later the psychological explanation his Under-Secretaries (he has been unable to find Ministers) give of Badoglio’s transformation. Now about the “military effort”.
This is our supreme duty as Italians. But the main fault of Badoglio is that he failed: after four months he has put in line 4000 men; while in Southern Italy there are very many thousands of men, disbanded in September, who might become again an army—but they want colonels and generals who are not pro-German as these proved to be when they betrayed our soldiers and Italy last September. But these generals are the King’s men; therefore they are tabu. There is more: a most conservative Italian, Senator Croce (the philosopher and historian) had promoted a body of volunteers; I had supported him on my arrival; we might have now a splendid little army of “partisans” like Tito’s20 in Croatia; these men might still be created; they might be precious to the Allies, on our mountains, to harass the Germans on their flanks. But the traitor king imposed Badoglio to have our volunteers suppressed.
I must tell you the bitter truth: Badoglio, whom I liked in the past, is unable to create an army. Here is the explanation his Under-Secretaries murmur; that he has become at once a tired discouraged man without any moral force left in him.
Who supports him? An old old old tale: that his adversaries are red. This is at the basis of the many tragicomic mistakes, I am afraid, of the Brindisi diplomats. Do you imagine Croce or me reds while we are the only ones who try to keep alive the principle of the representative monarchy.
As for Marshal Messe, he does not command general confidence; many are afraid that he might evolve into a South American “hero”.
As for the King, he is preparing a dreadful neo-fascism; Badoglio deplores it but does nothing; he allows all the Fascists to become a body of new official recruits of a new fascist regular army (to kill Italians, not Germans); just the contrary of what Croce and I wanted. May I speak with a sincerity which has its roots in my deep and grateful respect for America? If things go on that way, it will be said some day that the Allies made it impossible for Italy to come again into life, to take her share in the struggle, to spare American lives—and to spare time.
As you saw so well when you cabled me, Italian affairs are “in rapid political evolution”. Badoglio—I am sorry to say—is no more Badoglio; (any objective inquest will prove it to you); I cannot in conscience assume the power with the King or his son, because they are the symbol and the alibi of all the Fascists and because I want present and future true order in Italy, not a Franco21 order and [Page 440] future disorders. If Badoglio falls I’ll be glad to help anybody who may create a real military effort; but, be sure, this effort may only be the result of a destruction of Fascism—which the presence of the King makes impossible.
I’ll be glad to discuss any point with your representatives; I might even come to the United States for a short visit, if assured to come back at once to do here my duty; my most ardent wish is the closest cooperation with Washington.
Believe me
Most sincerely yours,
- Copy of letter transmitted to President Roosevelt by Mr. Berle.↩
- See telegram No. 2201, November 19, 7 p.m., to the Consul General at Algiers, p. 429.↩
- Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, President of the National Committee of Yugoslav Liberation and Commissar of National Defense.↩
- Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.↩