740.0011 European War 1939/31889: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant )

7188. Reference is made to Item B of Thursday’s agenda of the Political Warfare Coordinating Committee reported in your 7847, November 11, 8 p.m.5 The position described by Sir Orme Sargent6 is in general correct and the Department approves the propaganda line adopted. In reporting on the political crisis in Italy, General Eisenhower suggested the following formula which was approved by the War and State Departments. If the King were successful in forming a liberal government or if the King were unsuccessful and agreed to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples (which Sforza, Croce, et cetera, stated would be acceptable), no problem would arise. If, however, the King were unsuccessful in forming a broad-based government and refused to abdicate, the Allied Military Mission at Brindisi would be faced with a first-class constitutional crisis. General Eisenhower proposed that in the latter event the present arrangement with the King and Badoglio would be permitted to continue until Allied forces had occupied Rome.

According to information received in the Department on November 11 the King rejected Italian suggestions of abdication as well as Badoglio’s resignation and asked the latter to carry on until Rome is reached. Badoglio has agreed and is assembling an administration of technicians to operate in close cooperation with the Allied Control Commission. General Mason MacFarlane, prior to his departure from Brindisi, was instructed by AFHQ, in view of the approval of the Eisenhower formula by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, (1) that the temporary solution of the political crisis was acceptable and did not conflict with the Moscow decisions; (2) that decision on the publicity line must await development of the situation between Badoglio and Sforza; (3) that Badoglio should ask Sforza to refrain from sabotaging this temporary adjustment; and (4) that the Italian Government’s move to Naples was favored.

[Page 427]

General Joyce, the new Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission, reported on November 12 that he had a conversation with Badoglio who confirmed his intention to carry on until Rome was reached, when he would resign to permit the formation of a broad-based cabinet of political leaders. The Marshal was of the opinion that he could have a “cabinet of experts” functioning within a week. General Joyce reported that Badoglio mentioned several times his anticipation of serious difficulties within the armed forces if an abdication were forced upon the King now.

While the British are reluctant to interfere in the Italian crisis, it is obvious that they are inclined to be more disturbed at the prospect of the King’s abdication and its constitutional implications than we are. While many of the British arguments against a fundamental change at this time in the Italian political structure are valid, their attitude is probably dictated by their desire to protect, particularly in Europe, the dignity and prerogatives of monarchical institutions. Our policy is fundamentally to support that regime and authority which at the present time is in a position to furnish greatest aid and cooperation to the Allied war effort. If for any reason General Eisenhower should in the future decide that to force the abdication of the King would benefit the Allied war effort in Italy, the Department would approve the adoption of such a policy.

Hull
  1. Not printed.
  2. British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.