865.01/564: Telegram
The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:45 p.m.]
1781. From Murphy. Reports from Brindisi mission indicate a difference of views has arisen between Badoglio and Acquarone76 in respect to broadening of base of Italian Government.
Acquarone recently went to Naples to get in touch with some old liberals (see my telegram 1736, October 11, 8 p.m.73). Badoglio says this mission was a failure and describes liberals as “ghosts of a former era.” His view is that it is not possible to form a satisfactory Cabinet until after arrival in Rome since it would lack machinery of government and could not be effective or wholly national in character. He is now preparing a list of Cabinet possibilities who he hopes will be available on arrival in Rome but is in agreement with Acquarone that in any event no ex-Fascist will be included.
On the other hand Acquarone thinks that Monarchy would be endangered if matters are not rapidly adjusted with anti-Fascist groups and therefore he is anxious immediately to broaden base of [Page 410] the government. He was in touch with anti-Fascists in Naples in particular De Nicola former Parliamentarian and his group. They were invited to join the government but replied they did not wish to take part in a government headed by Badoglio. They perceive no personal objection to [the] Marshal but insist that head of government should be a civilian. They would be very glad to have Badoglio in the government as Minister of National Defense. Acquarone thinks this group is in a position to speak for Italian liberal elements in Rome and in general attaches more importance to Naples group than Badoglio.
We are not yet in a position to estimate either the strength and representative character of Acquarone’s liberal elements in Naples or possibility that Badoglio as head of government will be able to command sufficient support now or in future from liberal groups.
Macmillan and I propose to confer here with General MacFarlane and others during course of this week and then proceed to Brindisi to review situation on spot.
Our first thoughts meanwhile are we think we should continue to work for earliest possible broadening of government through introduction of representatives of liberal and labor groups. Should we work for a civilian premiership which has many advantages it would at same time be essential Badoglio remain in government in a position compatible with service he has rendered in bringing about the armistice. This we feel could be accomplished by giving him Ministry of National Defense and command of Army. If we should appear to discard individual who had been responsible for Italian declaration of war and co-belligerency it would give rise to serious doubt and confusion of mind both in Italy and abroad.
Furthermore we are not in favor of pressing for any change until we have secured from Badoglio important modifications in form of proposed amendments to long term armistice provisions and to naval agreement.78 We hope to achieve his signature to these modifications through our trip to Brindisi. Macmillan is sending a similar telegram to London.
Repeated to London and Moscow. [Murphy.]
- Gen. Tietro Acquarone, Minister to the Royal Household of Italy.↩
- Not printed.↩
- For text of Armistice terms of September 3, of Naval Agreement of September 23, and the Additional Conditions of the Armistice, September 29, 1943, see Department of State, United States and Italy, 1936–1946, Documentary Record (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 51, or Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2740.↩