740.00119 European War 1939/9–1943: Telegram
The Commander in Chief of Allied Forces (Eisenhower) to the War Department 87
NAF 409. The military mission which I dispatched to Brindisi September 13 has been in daily contact with the Badoglio Administration. The British and American Ministers who accompanied MacFarlane88 to Brindisi have now returned and the following analysis of the situation made during the course of our preliminary investigation on the spot may be of assistance to both Governments in determining our future Italian policy. It seems to me that certain decisions are urgently necessary.
Marshal Badoglio asserts that Italy is now in a de facto state of war with Germany. The Brindisi Administration, however, is free to exercise its authority, with Allied consent, over only 5 provinces of Italy with a population of about 2,000,000 and including about 3 army divisions, an insignificant Air Force and a certain amount of naval personnel. The bulk of the country is now under German control. All of Badoglio’s civilian Ministries remained in Rome. The Brindisi party consists of the King, Crown Prince Umberto, [Page 368] Badoglio, and a group of Generals and Admirals including Joint Chief of Staff Ambrosio, and the Army Chief of Staff Roatta. Marshal Badoglio and his associates claim that the civilian Ministers left in Rome are not disloyal but are merely separated from the Head of the Government by force majeure. It should be noted that the King and Badoglio left Rome by automobile in great haste at 5 a.m., September 9, proceeding to the port of Pescara on the Adriatic and thence by Italian cruiser to Brindisi. We believe, however, that there was dispute among the Italians regarding the wisdom of departure from Rome and the present position may be a straddle to protect better Italian interests.
The importance of the Badoglio Administration is its unchallenged claim to legality. Its only contestant is the newly established “Republican Fascist” Government said to be established in Northern Italy, maintaining certain “Commissioners” in Rome under German auspices. While Mussolini’s name is associated with the latter by German radio, our Brindisi contacts doubt that he has authorized the use of his name in that connection, believing that the party is headed by gangsters of the type of Farinacci, Sforza and the like.
We have little doubt of the sincerity of the Badoglio Administration to cooperate with the Allies. From the military point of view it thus far offers only a few divisions in territory free from the Germans. With the armed forces Badoglio unquestionably enjoys a definite prestige. While there is a pronounced atmosphere of sympathy for the Allies, it is also coupled with a spirit of defeatism.
The chief question which faces us and has a most important bearing on our military operations in Italy is the status to be given the Badoglio Administration and Italy as a whole. This vital point of policy will govern all executive action whether in the military, political or propaganda sphere.
Badoglio has made repeated references to the spirit of the message from the President and the Prime Minister.89 He points out to us that his administration is conscientiously and loyally carrying out the terms of the armistice and has surrendered the Italian fleet. The Italian people and the armed forces naturally regard an armistice as connoting a cessation of hostilities. His administration, however, stands for war against the Germans. How will the Italian people and the army, Badoglio asks, understand that this is their duty unless a status of at least co-belligerency can be given to Italy. Most of the problems which face us in Italy, directly affecting our military operations, depend upon the reply which our Governments will make. We have general instructions covering support to be given to Italian units or individuals who resist or oppose the Germans, and covering [Page 369] the employment of Italian naval vessels. Acting under these, we are preparing to group the three Italian divisions in the Calabria-Taranto area into a corps which will be placed under command of the 8th Army and used for static defense of ports, L of C, etc. Two or three additional divisions, which will become available by reason of the German evacuation of Sardinia, will be similarly employed later. Italian divisions in Corsica are now collaborating with French forces and are engaged against the Germans. Two Italian cruisers are being used to transport troops and supplies from North Africa to Corsica at considerable risk. All this, however, necessary as it is to our success, is inconsistent with the terms of the armistice, and as it will shortly become necessary for me to confer directly with Marshal Badoglio, I should be able to reassure him on a number of matters which will have a profound effect on our military relations with Italy during the period of active hostilities. For example, are the Italians to be disarmed and disbanded in accordance with the armistice, or used to actively assist our forces? Will the Navy be seized or used with Italian sailors? Will Allied Para-Military organizatoins work with the equivalent Italian organizations to whom we would supply radio equipment, etc.? Our present plan of Allied Military Government depends upon the policy we select. Will we adopt a policy of indirect control of government to replace Allied Military Government, at least in certain areas? My instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on several of these matters are clear, and are in accordance with military necessity and my own ideas, but they are not at all consistent with provisions of the long term armistice conditions to which I am instructed to obtain signature.
This raises the critical question of what action should be taken at this point regarding the signature of the complete armistice terms. We found that Marshal Badoglio does not clearly understand the necessity of signing these terms. In his mind the imposition of such terms is undoubtedly inconsistent with active Italian cooperation in the war effort against Germany.
It is obviously impracticable to adopt an effective propaganda line to the people of Italy until the government structure and the Italian status are clarified.
We feel that our Governments might wish to consider some form of de facto recognition of the Badoglio Administration as a co-belligerent or military associate subject to certain conditions:
- (a)
- Strengthening of the national character of the administration by infusion of representatives of political parties—a form of national coalition government.
- (b)
- A decree restoring the former constitution and promising free elections after the war for a constitutional assembly.
- (c)
- Possible eventual abdication of the King in favor of either his son or grandson. (This requires careful study as it might prove more popular abroad than with the Italian people).
- (d)
- Whatever military requirements we might decide upon.
- (e)
- Acceptance of an Allied organization in the nature of an armistice commission, but possibly with a different title from which the Italian administration would accept guidance and ultimate instructions. Allied Military Government would gradually disappear and its personnel be integrated where necessary in the new organization, while we might agree to suspend the application of certain rights under the armistice and regard the reformed and liberated Italy as a co-belligerent.
The benefits we have obtained already from the armistice are tremendous. We have Buttress, Goblet and Musket, almost without fighting, and will shortly have Brimstone and Firebrand, not to mention the fleet. Nevertheless, we have a hard and risky campaign before us, in which our relationship with the Italians may mean the difference between complete and only partial success. A formal meeting with Badoglio can hardly be deferred for more than 10 days, and I would be most grateful if the question I have raised here can be answered, and the policy of our two Governments be defined before that time. I realize that the line of action which I have suggested here will provoke political repercussions and may arouse considerable opposition and criticism. Accordingly I recommend that the burden be placed upon us, on the ground of military necessity, which I am convinced should be the governing factor.