Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

740.0011 European War 1939/30493: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, August 2, 1943—9 p.m.
[Received 10:12 p.m.]

5032. Thank you for your good message 4636, August 1, 1 p.m., which came in late last night. I could not reach Eden until 3 o’clock this afternoon London time as he was out of town. I found that since I sent you my message 4862, July 26, 6 p.m., he had communicated with the Russians., He explained to me that he felt obligated to do this because of the British-Russian treaty.⁵¹ I know that he had the support of the War Cabinet in this although I was not informed.

I will let him state the action taken in the aide-mémoire which I asked him to prepare for me and which, together with copies of the documents given to the Russians, follow below:

Aide-mémoire. A day or two ago the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires was given a summary of the draft instrument of Surrender, which is still before the United States Government (annex 1). It was made clear that this instrument was purely provisional, pending agreement with the U.S. Government, and that its terms might have to be modified. A note has now been received from Monsieur Sobolev⁵² saying that the Soviet Government consider the provisions contained in this summary to correspond fully to the existing conditions, and have no objection to them.

Since communicating the above to the Soviet Government, the President has suggested a shorter formula for a purely military arrangement to be used by General Eisenhower in case of necessity. The Prime Minister has indicated to the President that in case of emergency General Eisenhower may be authorized to present this document. But he has asked the President to consider further the draft instrument already communicated to Washington, so that, if agreement can be reached on it before the emergency arises, General Eisenhower may be authorized to present this fuller document in reply to any Italian request.

The Soviet Government are now being given a summary of the shorter document (annex 2) with an explanation of the circumstances in which it was drafted, and in which it may be used. End aide-mémoire.

Begin annex 1 to aide-mémoire. Summary of draft instrument of surrender for Italy.

The governing consideration is the prosecution of the war against Germany. Our aim is thus to secure the maximum strategic advantage and to avoid unnecessary commitments involving any dissipation of the war effort.

Provision is made for:

1. Acknowledgment of total defeat.

2. Italian participation in the war to cease in all theaters.

3. Withdrawal of the Italian armed forces from all areas outside Italian territory as and when directed.

4. Occupation of such parts of Italian territory as may be required.

5. Such measure of demobilization and disarmanent as may be prescribed.

6. The Italian fleet to assemble and to be dealt with as prescribed.

7. Control of airfields, ports and transport systems.

8. All merchant shipping and inland transport equipment to be made available.

9. Rights of passage for United Nations personnel, material, aircraft, and ships.

10. Control of all inter-communications and imposition of censorship.

11. War material to be stored and dealt with as prescribed.

12. Industrial and financial controls.

13. Severance of relations with the other Axis powers and prohibition of all intercourse with them.

14. Internment of Axis forces in Italy.

15. Surrender of war criminals.

16. Dissolution of the Fascist organization and repeal of any objectionable legislation.

17. Immediate handing over of all Allied prisoners of war. End annex 1 to aide-mémoire.

Begin annex 2 to aide-mémoire.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.

2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny to the Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and none of these may from the beginning of these negotiations be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

5. Agreement that Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief to meet the needs of his military-naval program.

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory both islands and mainland to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purpose as the Allies may see fit.

7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require and in particular the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied military government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization. End annex 2 to aide-mémoire.

In so far as the communications that have passed between the President and the Prime Minister in regard to terms with Italy are concerned, I have been fully informed, but there has been no discussion with me as regards the Russians except as I reported to you following my talk with Eden on July 26.⁵³ The first information given to the Russians was on July 30.

Eden thought that the statement you forwarded was excellent but of course recognized that it was too late to make it a joint statement. He suggested that we make it our own statement and add at the end of it that “we understand that the British Government has kept you informed of our joint ideas on the terms of surrender to be exacted from Italy”, and perhaps add that “we were in accord with this procedure”.

I helped draft the above statement, except the last sentence. It is my opinion that your statement with the added paragraph would be worth doing. You have asked the Russians in the last paragraph of the statement for suggestions and agreed to reply to specific inquiries. The British have done neither; they have limited both their messages to simply informing them. Their method calls for no reciprocal action beyond giving them information in similar circumstances. Ours puts the Russians under an obligation to seek suggestions from us and to reply to specific inquiries by us if we choose to make them.

Winant

51. Treaty for an alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and providing also for collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter concluded between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at London, May 26, 1942. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, p. 1038.
52. Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev, Counselor of Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom. His appointment as Soviet Ambassador to Canada was announced July 28, 1943.
53. See the Ambassador’s telegram No. 4862, July 26, 6 p.m., p. 335.