Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

740.0011 European War 1939/28233: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, February 9, 1943—8 p.m.

889. Your 382, January 15, noon. I have read with great interest Mr. Eden’s letter of January 14 setting forth the British position with respect to Italy and have noted with considerable satisfaction that we are in substantial accord with all the views expressed. We wish to make certain reservations, however, which are a matter of emphasis rather than fundamental differences of opinion.

To all intents and purposes we feel that Italy is effectively occupied by the Germans at the present time. We consider it debatable that a full scale occupation in the event of an internal collapse would require sending a considerable number of additional troops into Italy. It seems certain, however, that effective occupation would require additional manpower for administrative purposes at least. It would in any event be an additional heavy responsibility on the Germans which they could ill afford to undertake as the war closes in on them. Furthermore, the onus of the inevitable deterioration of the internal supply situation would fall squarely on the Germans.

We agree entirely that a condition for a separate peace is the weakening of Germany to the point where she can no longer control events in Italy. We believe, however, that the second condition, namely, the emergence of a national leader or leaders in opposition to Mussolini, cannot be fulfilled while the Germans through the Fascist Government continue in effective control of Italy. The opposition groups which are known to exist can, therefore, be expected to bring their plans into the open only when the weakening of the German-supported Fascist Government promises them some assurance of success.

Concerning the House of Savoy, as distinguished from Victor Emanuel III, our information leads us to believe that it may have sufficient support of conservative elements in Italy, including the aristocracy, the army and the peasantry, to retain the sovereign power at least during the interim period between the Fascist regime and its permanent successor.

Concerning the most effective means of eliminating Italy from the war, we feel that aerial bombardment of Italy should be confined to military objectives as much as is humanly possible. Indiscriminate bombing of Italian cities will only stiffen Italian morale. For the first two and one-half years of the war the British enjoyed an unparalleled reputation among Italians for discriminate bombing of legitimate targets despite the frantic efforts of the Fascist press and radio to the contrary. On the other hand they have no illusions about the brutality of German methods.

While we agree that a firm line of propaganda should be adopted to convince the Italians that we intend to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion we believe that threats of destruction as a people and a country, unless and until they request an armistice, should be avoided. We are both in agreement that a separate peace is remote for reasons beyond the control of the Italian people. Consequently, threats of physical violence, unless certain improbable conditions are fulfilled, would not in our opinion prove effective propaganda but rather would react to our detriment.

We believe that it is not too early to attempt to detach the Italians from the Fascist regime. Mental and spiritual disloyalty already exist to a great extent and if properly appealed to can, we believe, be effective in furthering the disruption of the Axis war effort in Italy. Our propaganda should—in addition to convincing the Italians that we will win this war—also appeal to their overwhelming desire to end the conflict. In view of the German domination of their country the persuasion of our broadcasts should be directed towards a constant and ever-increasing campaign of passive resistance, civil disobedience and sabotage short of open revolt. When referring to our determination to prosecute the war with increasing vigor against Italy, we should explain to the Italian people that this is the regrettable but local result of the Fascist Government’s unprovoked declarations of war against Great Britain and the United States.

While we agree that we do not wish to make any postwar commitments to the Italians, at least for the present, we would like reaction of the British authorities to certain general phrases which might be used with reassuring effect in our propaganda. Those which have occurred to us as proving useful in combatting Axis propaganda are “The United States and its Allies have no intention of destroying Italy as a nation”; “The United States and its Allies have no intention of depriving the Italian people of those territories which are and have always been essentially Italian” and other statements of a similar nature.

While we recognize that Italy may be of doubtful interest strategically to our military leaders, our whole approach to the Italian problem is based on the assumption that the Italian people and their fundamental good will toward both our nations can and should be used in the prosecution of our common war effort. Even if a landing operation is never attempted in Italy itself, it would seem unwise to alienate the affections of a people who could threaten the flank of an Allied landing operation in southern Europe.

In conclusion we would like to emphasize the following considerations:

1. Our propaganda should impress upon the Italians the hopelessness of their present position in the war.

2. We should prosecute the war with all possible force in Italy upon all occasions by attacking by land, sea and air military objectives only.

3. We should in our propaganda and by all other means encourage passive resistance and sabotage of the Italian war effort.

4. We should avoid ridiculing the Italian armed forces or the Italian people or inciting them to premature revolt.

5. Without making any specific political or territorial commitments we should hold out to the Italian people the hope that Italy as a nation will survive after the defeat of the Fascist Government and that neither we nor our Allies have territorial ambitions with respect to that territory which is and has always been essentially Italian.

Through military action already taken by American armed forces, it is evident that the United States in the prosecution of the war against the Axis does not intend to spare Italy from the consequences and ravages of war because of American sympathy for the Italian people. In connection with this general subject of our attitude toward Italy, I understand that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are now giving consideration to the matter from the point of view of the military developments of the war.

In transmitting our observations to the Foreign Secretary please thank him for his letter of January 14 and inform him that we would welcome any further comments from him on our views.

Hull