740.0011 European War 1939/28232: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:30 p.m.]
7188. For the President and the Secretary. I have just received the following letter from Eden:2
“I feel that the United States Government should know that we have received in recent weeks certain ‘peace feelers’ from Italians outside Italy. They are as follows:
1. The Italian Legation at Lisbon have used a Roumanian intermediary to show His Majesty’s Embassy and the Polish Embassy at Lisbon their interest in a separate peace.
We have decided not to pursue this ‘feeler’ since the Italians in Lisbon are servants of the present regime and to maintain contact with them could only serve to throw suspicion on our declarations that we are out to destroy Fascism.
2. The Italian Consul General at Geneva3 is anxious to establish a channel of communication between His Majesty’s Government and the Duke of Aosta (formerly Duke of Spoleto). The Duke is represented [Page 316] as being prepared, in return for certain guarantees from us, to lead an armed uprising against Mussolini and the Fascist regime. He is said to be confident that he can count on the support of the Italian Navy and certain elements in the Bersaglieri,4 although he could not depend on the Army, and the Italian Air Force is stated to be definitely Fascist.
The guarantees required would [be?]
- (a)
- RAF support to deal with the Germans and Italian Air Force,
- (b)
- an agreed landing by British and United States troops, on the understanding that they should land as Allies to assist in the overthrow of the regime and not as troops to conquer and occupy Italy;
- (c)
- no demands to be made to hand over the Italian Fleet;
- (d)
- preservation of the monarchy in Italy;
- (e)
- guarantees on these lines to be given in the name of all the Allied countries.
Our view is that this approach is probably genuine. But we are not greatly impressed by the possibilities of making anything of it. It is clear for instance that we would find a hostile air force, no support from the army with the exception of the Bersaglieri (i.e. at most about 27,000 men), and probably no active cooperation from the navy. Point (b) moreover stipulates an ‘agreed landing’ which at best presents complicated problems of coordination and timing and at worst may be nothing better than a trap.
Nevertheless the prize to be won if we can hasten an Italian collapse is so great that we have decided that it is worthwhile keeping this line of communication open. The Duke of Aosta has undertaken to discuss his plan with the Prince of Piedmont and to inform our intermediary of the result.
The Italian Consul General at Geneva told our intermediary that certain overtures had already been made to the United States Government via the Vatican by an Italian group in opposition to Mussolini. We should naturally be much interested to know whether this was in fact the case, and to learn of any similar approaches that the United States Government may have received or may in the future receive from Italian sources.
I am sending a similar letter to Monsieur Maisky,5 except for the above paragraph.”
I shall appreciate your instructions as to the nature of the reply I should make to the above letter.