851.01/3174½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the American Representative to the Political-Military Commission at Algiers (Wilson)23
I had a long talk last night with General de Gaulle. I began it by saying that there seemed to be some misunderstandings between Algiers and Washington, which ought to be cleared up. General de Gaulle asked: “You think they are only misunderstandings?” I replied: “Yes, I think they are only misunderstandings; what do you think they are?” He said: “I have come to wonder whether it was not a matter of policy on the part of your Government.” I asked him just what he meant concretely. He then said that it was hard for him to escape the conclusion that our Government and military [Page 189] authorities have deliberately sought to keep him down, to put him in a subordinate place, and to support and build up other French leaders whom we preferred to deal with. He spoke of our continuing diplomatic relations with Pétain and Vichy, of our dealing with Darlan, and of the Peyrouton affair. I said that surely he must understand that our continuing relations with Pétain and Vichy had been a sound policy, as it had permitted us to prepare the landings in North Africa leading to the ultimate liberation of France. I said that I felt the misunderstandings were due in part to his failure to appreciate the fact that the United States Government and people are not thinking politically about France, but are thinking solely in terms of getting on with the war and defeating Hitler. I said that I felt there was a failure on the part of many people here in Algiers to understand our position, that the war against Hitler is only the first part of our war, and that after we have liquidated Hitler we must turn to the war against Japan. France has only one war—against Hitler. Our Government and people are thinking in terms of getting these two wars or two aspects of the one war over with as quickly as possible and getting our young men back to our country.
General de Gaulle said that he understood that it was reasons of military necessity which counseled our maintaining relations with Vichy, and our dealing with Darlan. He said, however, that he could never understand why we had not taken him into our confidence about the North African landings. He said that if we had told him of what we intended to do, that we were bringing Giraud to North Africa to help our war effort, then he, de Gaulle, would have understood and helped in every way possible. Instead of that, he said, he was kept in ignorance, and then after the military effort was over in North Africa, instead of limiting Giraud to his military role, we had tried to build Giraud up as a political leader and to relegate him, de Gaulle, to a secondary role. He insisted that this was what we had done, stating that at the meeting at Anfa, Giraud had become convinced that he would be supported by the United States as the leader of the French, and that when he, de Gaulle, had then proposed to Giraud an arrangement for the French Committee under which de Gaulle would be the political head and Giraud in control of the army, Giraud had refused. It was only now, today, General de Gaulle said, that Giraud had at last been brought to accept the fact that he could not continue as a political co-president of the Committee and at the same time be the head of the armed forces (the Committee was reorganized this afternoon).23a General de Gaulle said that Giraud was a great [Page 190] military leader, but should remain exactly that. He said that he had been glad to turn over to Giraud’s command all the troops who had once been his, de Gaulle’s.
General de Gaulle said that at one of President Roosevelt’s press conferences the President had stated that General Giraud commanded 300,000 troops and he, de Gaulle only 12,000. He said that this was not entirely exact, since he then had about 100,000, but that apart from this the evident intention and effect of the statement had been to play him down and to build up Giraud.
General de Gaulle said that when Archbishop Spellman visited him here, the Archbishop, who gave the impression that he was speaking for President Roosevelt, had proposed to de Gaulle that the latter accept a secondary role under Giraud. I expressed doubts of this, saying that I felt that General de Gaulle must have misunderstood what the Archbishop said. General de Gaulle replied that on the contrary the Archbishop had been very clear and had used the illustration that as Eisenhower was the Commanding General and Alexander24 accepted an important but secondary role under him, so de Gaulle should accept a secondary role under Giraud.
I caught up an inference General de Gaulle had made that it was feared that when our troops landed in France we might deal with Vichy on some plea of military expediency. I said that I was astounded that he should make such an inference. I stated that I was convinced that the only dealings we would have with Vichy would be to liquidate it. I said that he might be interested to know what Secretary of State Hull had said to me a few days ago on returning from the Moscow Conference when I mentioned to him that this fear seemed to exist in some quarters. Mr. Hull had replied: “That is preposterous. The chance of that is zero, simply zero.” General de Gaulle said that this fear did exist, there had been the Darlan and Peyrouton incidents, our support of Giraud which to many meant an ultimate deal with Vichy, etc., but he was greatly interested and relieved at what I had said.
I asked General de Gaulle how he saw the situation in France after liberation as regards the setting up of French governmental authority. He replied that it was of course difficult to prophesy, but since I had asked the question he would give me frankly his views. He said that upon liberation of sections of French territory, members of the resistance groups, who are numerous and well-organized, would appear and undoubtedly play an important role. He said that as French territory is cleared and the Allied Armies get to Paris or some other large city, he and the members of the French Committee would go to France “unless you (the United States) forbid it”, that he was convinced [Page 191] that there would be wide-spread support for him, that steps would be taken to set up a provisional government representing all major French political groups, and that this provisional government would be in power until the war prisoners and enforced laborers could be brought back from Germany and elections held freely by the French people for a National Assembly to decide the future government of France. It would be for the people to decide, he said, who would be the head of this government, it might be him, de Gaulle, it might be anybody else the people wanted. He said that he hoped that at the time of setting up the provisional government, outstanding political leaders like President Lebrun, Herriot, and Jeanneney, would come forward and support the provisional government to give it as great an appearance of legality as possible.
General de Gaulle said that he hoped very much that the United States would not seek to restrain him from going to France at the time that French territory was liberated, since he felt that unless prompt action was taken to establish order, matters would drift into civil war. He said that prompt action would be necessary above all to prevent the Communists from seizing control. I remarked that this seemed to be another of the misunderstandings, as I could not see how he could believe that the United States would prevent him or any other French political leader from returning to France.
General de Gaulle said something of his movement, Gaullisme. He said that he himself was a symbol for resistance. That the French people have gone through a terrible period of defeat and suffering, that it has affected them all, and that resistance is the one thing that all loyal Frenchmen are interested in. He himself has stood for resistance from the beginning, it is this that gives him his strength. He said that it is his belief that France cannot return to the same system of weak, corrupt governments which it had before the war. This simply would not be good enough after all the suffering. France will have a republic and a democratic form of government, but the government will be stronger. These, he said, were his ideas, but the people of France will decide.
I said that, speaking of misunderstandings, there is one which existed in the minds of some people, and that was that he intended to make himself a dictator and to rule France by personal power. He smiled and asked whether anyone who knew the French people believed that they would accept a dictator. He said that when he came to Algiers he was accompanied by only three or four people. He has no military forces, he has no naval forces. The armed forces are under the control of General Giraud. He said that that did not look to him very much like a dictator.
General de Gaulle spoke briefly of the provisional Consultative Assembly. He said that many of its members had recently come from [Page 192] France, belong to resistance groups, and are extreme in their views. He said he thought the Assembly would be a good opportunity to work off pent-up emotions. He felt that gradually the Assembly would become more moderate and prove a useful organization.
- Transmitted to the Department by Mr. Wilson in his letter of November 12 to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews).↩
- During the French Committee of National Liberation session of November 6, 1943, a decision was reached that all commissioners would resign in order that a new list of members could be drawn up. By a decree of November 9 General de Gaulle became the sole President and the new membership of the Committee was designated.↩
- Gen. Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, British military leader in North Africa.↩