851.01/2568
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: Etienne Boegner who, you will remember, was on the de Gaullist Delegation here and who resigned and went to join General Giraud, has just come in to see me. He is here with General Giraud.88 He made a tangible suggestion which I think is thoroughly [Page 170] worth considering. He is convinced that General de Gaulle, despite his protestations, is now merely the promoter of the equivalent of a French Nazi movement with himself as Fuehrer, and that both the French and the Allied cause are in grave danger if it gets out of hand.
According to Boegner, Giraud, being no politician, has allowed himself to be jockeyed out of position after position, partly I regret to say, because Monnet and some of the people in Algiers convinced Giraud that he could not count on the firm support of the United States. By consequence, unless great care is taken, General de Gaulle may wind up in sole personal control of a French Army which he hopes to arm from the United States, and which he will then use to force a dictatorship on France.
Boegner suggests:
- (1)
- that General Giraud’s position as commander-in-chief of the French army be strengthened and reinforced;
- (2)
- that an agreement be made between him as commander-in-chief of the French army and General Eisenhower (or other appropriate American officer) representing the Command of the American Expeditionary Force. This presumably would cover delivery of arms and supplies for which General Giraud is asking;
- (3)
- this agreement should have a clause providing for a Committee of Liaison and Administration between the American Command and the French Command. This might consist of three Americans and three Frenchmen. The Liaison Committee should have general jurisdiction over the handling of the supplies, equipment and reorganization of the French army, and also over the exercise of whatever civil functions (police, keeping order, etc.) General Giraud may have to exercise as commander of the army. The three French officers should be appointed by General Giraud from his command. The whole transaction should be independent of the French Committee of Liberation. The prime function of this Liaison and Administration Committee should be the protection of the integrity of the French army; its maintenance as a strictly French command and not as the partisans of any party or personality. (This is in line, of course, with our own policy of not undertaking to prejudge ultimate political solutions in France.);
- (4)
- a clause in the contract should provide for training centers in which the French troops are trained in the use of the new American weapons for which they are asking. This, Boegner believes, is essential, and General Giraud who has little knowledge of the new weapons wholly realizes that this is a procedure already found necessary in the American armies. These training centers could also be administered under general guidance of the Committee of Liaison and Administration;
- (5)
- in general, the Committee of Liaison should be built up so that it could serve as the guardian of American and French interests and of Allied interests generally, as contrasted with any partisan interests which might intrude themselves.
Boegner says that the bitterness and betrayals and personal intrigues in North Africa are beyond description. He thinks it was a [Page 171] great mistake for General Giraud not to have accepted General de Gaulle’s resignation when it was offered, believing that in that case, unity might have been postponed, but “we did not get unity anyhow”.
He adds that General Giraud ought to be disabused of the impression that he was compelled to yield because of American feeling in the matter. He says that Monnet convinced Giraud that he, monnet, could interpret the real American attitude for him. He feels that our attitude should be one of surprise that he made as many concessions as he did, and of very firm insistence that the power and prerogatives of the military command at the moment must be maintained in any event.
I feel this important enough to pass on to you at once. You may even wish to send a copy of it or the substance of it to the White House.
- General Giraud was in the United States at this time for consultation with respect to affairs in French North Africa.↩