President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)57
288. I am fed up with De Gaulle and the secret personal and political machinations of that Committee in the last few days indicates that there is no possibility of our working with De Gaulle. If these were peace times it wouldn’t make so much difference but I am absolutely convinced that he has been and is now injuring our war effort and that he is a very dangerous threat to us. I agree with you that he likes neither the British nor the Americans … I agree with you that the time has arrived when we must break with him. It is an intolerable situation. I think the important thing is that we act together and my thinking regarding the whole matter runs about as follows:
We must divorce ourselves from De Gaulle because … he has more recently been interested far more in political machinations than he has in the prosecution of the war and these machinations have been carried on without our knowledge and to the detriment of our military interests. One result of this scheming on the part of De Gaulle has been that Eisenhower has had to give half his time to a purely [Page 156] local political situation which De Gaulle has accentuated. The war is so urgent and our military operations so serious and fraught with danger that we cannot have them menaced any longer by De Gaulle.
Our two countries have solemnly pledged that they will liberate the French Republic and when we drive the Germans out, return that country to the control of the sovereign French people. This pledge we renew.
All of the above can be put by us in language which will be mutually agreeable. Above all I am anxious that the break be made on a basis and for reasons which are identical with both our Governments. There are plenty of emotional and dissident people throughout the world who will try to separate England and the United States in this matter and we must stand shoulder to shoulder, identically and simultaneously through this miserable mess. My affirmative thought is that we should go ahead and encourage the creation of a committee of Frenchmen made up of people who really want to fight the war and are not thinking too much about politics. I am sure we can find such a group. During the formation period we can continue to deal with the military authorities as in the past.
The first step in any event should be the deferment of any meeting of the French Committee in North Africa until later. In the meantime you can well suggest your views as to how you will approach and deal with the De Gaulle situation most effectively from the standpoint of later public opinion, also anything this government might say concurrently with any public utterance you may make. Will you communicate with Macmillan to cooperate with Eisenhower in postponing any further meeting of the French Committee in North Africa.
I am anxious to have your thoughts on this as soon as possible.
The following is a paraphrase of a cable I have today sent to General Eisenhower:
“To General Eisenhower secret and personal from the President. To Mr. Murphy for information.
Murphy’s telegram 110858 is very disturbing. I wish you would carefully read once more War Department Number Nine59 relative to your W2382 of the 10th of June.60
The position of this government is that, during our military occupation of North Africa, we will not tolerate the control of the French Army by any agency which is not subject to the Allied Supreme Commander’s direction. We must have someone whom we completely and wholly trust. We would under no circumstances continue the arming of a force without being completely confident in their willingness to cooperate in our military operations; we are not interested, moreover, in the formation of any government or committee which presumes in any way to indicate that, until such time as the French [Page 157] people select a government for themselves, it will govern in France. When we get into France, the Allies will have a civil government plan that is completely in consonance with French sovereignty. Lastly, it must be absolutely clear that in North and West Africa we have a military occupation and, therefore, without your full approval no independent civil decision can be made.
Our policy, as you know, has been to encourage, as long as they cooperate with our military interests, local officials to manage their own affairs. It is our policy to encourage an extension of this; but civil or military direction which in any way might endanger the safety of our troops, our lines of communication, or otherwise interfere with our military operations must not be tolerated by us. This would include the necessity of keeping in North Africa more troops than we now plan.
I want to state for your exclusive information that at this time we will not permit De Gaulle to direct himself or to control through partisans on any committee, the African French army, either in the field of supplies, training, or operations.
This message has been seen by Hull and Marshall and has their approval.
Please acknowledge receipt.
Again I want to assure you that you are authorized to take such action as you think best in behalf of this government.”