851.01/2239: Telegram
The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 9—4:36 p.m.]
1063. From Murphy. I had talks today with General de Gaulle and Massigli separately. De Gaulle was in a most amiable and conciliatory mood, insisting throughout conversation of his great desire to cooperate with the United States and recognizing French dependence on our country to liberate France and rebuild the French nation. He said that definite progress is being made in the work of the Committee which devoted is [its?] session today to a discussion of the military establishment. He said that the French must have regard for realities and not imagine that they will be able to construct a large military establishment in the near future. In his opinion a force of not more than eight divisions is possible by 1944. There would, of course, be additional garrison troops for the policing and protection of the far flung territories but a striking force available for European operations in his opinion would not exceed the figure mentioned. He said also that it would be foolish to hope for an invasion force of more than about 15 groups which together with a small navy is the extent of the contribution that France could hope to make. He proposes the elimination of superannuated generals stating the present total of 185 French generals is absurd.
He said that he is in agreement that General Giraud whose qualifications he recognizes, continue as CinC of the combat troops but [Page 143] that a member of the Committee should perform as [apparent omission] customary functions following to a Minister of War. This is the function he would like to perform which would also carry with it command of the garrison troops in the rear areas. No decision has been taken and the matter will continue under discussion.
De Gaulle talked at length regarding communism. He said the French Communist Party had by its resistance to Germany gained an important place in France and he feared that unless a capable French administration is built up in time to control the Communist element there would be grave danger of widespread violence in France after liberation. His references to communism as a danger led me to question him regarding whether he feared communism as such. He hesitated and said “no” but that there is bitter feeling between the French working classes and the bourgeoisie. He indicated that in his opinion he felt he is qualified to control the French Communist Party. Stalin’s dissolution of the Comintern he termed as a gesture to lull the world into a sense of security and is designed to eliminate the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact.49
He denied that the forces under General de Larminat are still engaged in recruiting among the forces under the command of General Giraud and said there would be no further question on this score because of the fusion that would occur. He also said that in his opinion that while there would be a French CinC the only possible way the French Army could function temporarily would be in the form of army corps under Allied High Command.
Massigli said that the Committee had taken a definite decision condemning competitive recruiting as between the Giraud and de Gaulle forces as part of the program of fusing these forces.
Massigli also emphasized his desire to cooperate with U. S. insisting that he and the other members of the former French National Committee intended to be frank and cooperative.
He will return to London shortly to liquidate his affairs there and asked that we expedite the travel of several of his associates necessary in the conduct of foreign affairs.
André Philip called and said that he proposed to devote himself exclusively to the direction of resistance groups in France. Due to geography and facilities he said that of necessity much of this work would be directed from London and that it would be necessary for him to maintain part of his organization there. I indicated that I felt that we would wish to have some influence in the resistance movements in France and must be kept informed of his activities. I pointed [Page 144] to the recent unfortunate incident at Corsica conducted by the de Gaullist organization without our knowledge which resulted in the capture of their organization on the island disrupting incidentally one of our secret radio transmitters.
I have no illusions regarding the ambitious activities of members of the de Gaulle group such as Gaston Palewski but I see no evidence that they intend to adopt anything but peaceful means to acquire more and more power and influence.
Sent to Department, repeated to London. [Murphy.]
- Pact between Germany and Japan, signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 153. For additional secret agreement, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. i, p. 734, footnote 2a.↩