740.0011 Pacific War/3428

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Soong) to the Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary: I enclose herewith a memorandum on the question of China’s representation on various inter-allied committees, which we discussed when I saw you this morning.

I also enclose for your information a memorandum on our assignments of Canadian munitions. While it may not be as detailed as my verbal discussion with you, it is an outline which includes the essential points.

I am [etc.]

Tse Vun Soong
[Page 94]
[Enclosure 1]

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Soong) to the Secretary of State

1.
On many occasions the United States Government has declared it to be its policy that four amongst the United Nations, namely the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R. and China, which are bearing the main burden of the war effort, shall also assume the responsibility for the conduct of the war and for the maintenance of peace.
2.
Indeed, on one notable occasion when a joint United Nations agreement, that relating to Relief and Rehabilitation, was being elaborated, the four Governments, upon the invitation of the U. S. Department of State, entered into protracted discussions and secured agreement amongst themselves before the draft instrument was presented to other United Nations.
3.
The necessity for such prior consultations was stressed on many occasions in official pronouncements by the United States and British Governments. On no major issue, however, either relative to the conduct of the war or to preparations for the future peace, has this practice been followed so far.
4.
Since that date there have been formed numerous inter-Allied agencies, civilian and military, for the daily conduct of the war and for the preparation of the transition from war to peace, and in each case their membership was limited to United States and British representatives, although these agencies are assumed to be acting on behalf of the United Nations.
Repeated inquiries by Chinese representatives as to their participation in these agencies have met with negative replies. Moreover, the Chinese representatives have not even been called upon to present China’s programs or plans themselves when China’s case is under deliberation before these agencies. On the one or two occasions when Chinese representatives did present statements before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, they were heard rather as witnesses and did not participate in the actual deliberations, nor were they parties to the final recommendations although these related to war operations of vital interest to China.
5.
While the assumed existence of the Four Power leadership continued to be emphasized by American and British officials, no Chinese representative was invited to the Casablanca or Washington conferences at which plans were adopted affecting the China theatre of war of the United Nations, over which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is in supreme command. These decisions were only communicated afterwards and the consequential misunderstandings in the interpretation [Page 95] of the commitments made to China would have been avoided, had a procedure for genuine joint collaboration been established and acted upon.
6.
While the Chinese Government fully appreciates the courtesy of being informed in informal conversations of some of the matters under discussion between the United States and British Governments, yet in its view this procedure falls far short of the political consultation which is implied by its membership of the group of Four leading powers, and which was followed in regard to “Relief and Rehabilitation.”
7.
The new war situation in Europe and the new strategy against Japan are now again under review by the United States and British Governments at Quebec. Their conclusions will affect the future structure of world relationship and of post-war alignments. The Chinese Government can no longer hide from its people, whose will determined the decision to oppose Japan in 1937, and from the army, the fact that China is not a party to either the consultations or the decisions for the conduct of Allied war operations and Allied peace plans.
8.
The Chinese Government therefore in all earnestness proposes that:
(a)
existing joint and combined agencies, such as the Munitions Assignment Board, be enlarged to include Chinese representation on a footing of equality;
(b)
inter-Allied machinery, with equal Chinese representation, be created with a view to insuring coordination of efforts to carry into effect all decisions jointly reached;
(c)
upon the occasion of the Quebec Conference a joint declaration be made in the above sense.
[Enclosure 2]

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Soong) to the Secretary of State

Memorandum Regarding Canadian Munitions

Many months ago the Chinese Government approached the Canadian Government for aid in supplying munitions under their Mutual Aid Plan. A definite program, embracing nearly 60,000 tons of ordnance and supplies for the next year, was mutually agreed upon between myself representing the Chinese Government, and Mr. Howe, the Canadian Minister of Munitions. The program received the official sanction of the Canadian Government, and orders have been actually placed by them.

[Page 96]

None of these munitions would involve taking away any essential supply of munitions required by the U. S. or British armies. Shipping for these supplies to India (where the Chinese Government intend to keep a stock pile of these goods until the Burma Road or some alternate route, such as the Iranian Highway through Central Asia, could be developed) are likewise available.

On various pretexts, technicalities were advanced by the American authorities through Dr. Lauchlin Currie to have the Canadian Government either stop or curtail these supplies.

The Secretary is earnestly requested to approach the President to give instructions that all objections, which are indeed not in line with the broad and generous friendship of the United States for China, be withdrawn.