Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

740.0011 Pacific War/3525

The Chargé in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

No. 249

New Delhi, October 26, 1943.
[Received November 5.]

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a most interesting memorandum⁴⁸ prepared by Mr. John Davies, Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Chungking attached to the staff of Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, on the subject of “British Intimations for the Future.” The memorandum was prepared as a result of a conversation between Mr. Davies, two British propaganda officials, and representatives of the United States Office of War Information in New Delhi and Chungking. Mr.… is an important British propaganda official.

The following are the principal contributions made by the British participants:

1. Anglo-American collaboration in the post-war era is not only desirable but essential.

2. The British standard of living is inextricably bound up with imperialism.

3. The British people will be reluctant after the defeat of Germany to fight another war in Asia.

4. Russia will occupy Manchuria, and Korea will become a kingdom.⁴⁹

5. American and British troops will occupy Japan and Russia will have comparatively little to say with regard to a settlement with the Japanese.

6. Japan should not be crushed but should be used as a counter against Russia and China.

7. A future war between the Anglo-American bloc and a Soviet-Chinese-Indian-Japanese coalition will start in India. The fissiparous force in India is religion. Education will remove the religious differences and leave India united.

There is almost complete unanimity among British officials in New Delhi that post-war Anglo-American collaboration is essential but one has a definite feeling that they view British fighting in Asia as having the primary purpose of re-establishing and extending British imperialist interests. Distrust of the Chinese and fear of a strong and united post-war China are characteristic of British officialdom here.

The chief points made in the conversation by Mr. Davies are:

1. In the minds of most Americans a better world is identified with the abolition of imperialism, and there is a very real danger that the United States may again become isolationist after the war as a result of a feeling by the American people that they have been made dupes of British imperialism.

2. Our policy is apparently based on the conviction that we need Britain as a first-class power; Britain cannot be a first-class power without its empire; we are accordingly committed to the support of the British empire.

3. If Britain does not want the United States to go isolationist, it must be careful to leave us some freedom to state our own case in Asia.

The Mission considers Mr. Davies’ appraisement of the consequences which may be expected to flow from our apparent policy of supporting British aims in Asia to be sound. It matters little whether this is our actual policy or whether by our silence we allow that conclusion to be drawn by Asiatics. The result is the same, namely, a growing conviction among the people of this part of the world that American policy is at one with the British in desiring the restoration and extension of “whitetocracy” in Asia. The long-range consequence of such a conviction will, it would seem, be an alignment of the colored races against the whites as their only hope of freedom and progress.⁵⁰

Respectfully yours,

George R. Merrell

48. Not printed.

49. On this point Mr. Davies’ memorandum reads as follows:

    “When Manchuria’s fate becomes evident, Mr.… asked, what line will the United States follow. I asked if he meant by Manchuria’s fate that the Russians would occupy that area. He replied in the affirmative. I said that I did not think that we would fight the Russians on that issue.

    I asked Mr.… what he thought the fate of Korea would be. He replied that he expected Korea to be a kingdom. I asked why it would not be an autonomous Soviet Republic. He explained that an agreement would probably be reached before long by which borders would be established as of the period before the Russo-Japanese war. Thus, he felt, the Soviet Union would get its revenge for its defeat in 1905. I feel that this interpretation is an oversimplification.”

50. On November 23, the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) commented: “Mr.…, as you will note, goes in for ‘realism’ in a big way and does not allow his style to be cramped by such things as the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter”.

    In an attached memorandum dated November 24, the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) added: “I think Mr. Davies is probably getting into pretty deep water. For one thing, I doubt if the British Empire is going to exist solely because of our ‘commitment to recreate’ it. It would equally be argued that Great Britain, by defending us against the Germans, had ‘chosen’ to maintain the United States as a first-class power.

    The real problem, as it seems to me, is whether the purely ‘imperialist’ line is in all respects the best way of securing that international development which makes it possible for Britain to continue to be a first-class power.

    She might, as she has before, conceivably find that the commonwealth idea proved a stronger policy than the ‘empire’ idea.”

    A penciled notation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) states: “I think Davies has something here which should be circulated. Perhaps he is too pessimistic, but it may well be that future historians will say ‘You were warned and did nothing about it.’ On the other hand, who will do anything about it. That is the tragedy.”