740.0011 Pacific War/3345: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 21—2:32 p.m.]
1221. Department’s 859, July 6, 4 p.m. It is believed that the term “Jap divisions” is correct as, according to the Acting Military Attaché, a number of Jap divisions include units which contain a mixture of Jap and puppet troops including the third division normally based on Hankow which took part in the fighting in June in the Santowping area. Assumption that the puppet members of this and perhaps other units engaged in recent fighting in the Hupeh–Hunan sector was based on information from Chinese intelligence that when the third division, which had been engaged in the 1942 Chekiang-Kiangsi campaign, was reformed in November of that year some of its units were composed of Japs, Koreans and Manchurians in the ratio named.
Upon further and considerable detailed inquiry into the matter, it appears that Chinese intelligence has not been consistent in regard to the activities of Manchurian and Nanking puppet troops, possibly because battles and campaigns are almost always colored with much [Page 75] propaganda. Admiral Yang now states that he does not think that any Manchurian puppets participated in the recent Hupeh–Hunan fighting but that Nanking troops were employed by the Japs for “secondary defense duties” which in most cases comprised the guarding of supply lines and garrison duties. He names specifically the twenty-ninth Nanking puppet division as having guarded supply lines and states that this division has Jap officers acting in advisory and staff capacities down to and including the infantry company and that only “a few if any” Koreans are among the staff and advisory officers. There are stories in regard to the Hupeh–Hunan fighting to the effect that some of the puppets furnished intelligence to Central Government troops which facilitated the bombing of Jap supply lines; that some puppets deserted to the Central Government, and that others broke under attack and caused Jap retirements. These stories have not been confirmed but it is generally accepted that the Japs were weakened because of the number and character of puppet troops either operating as distinct puppet units or as component parts of Jap contingents.
Reverting to the question of the presence of Manchurian troops in Central China, the Acting Military Attaché has furnished us a summary of a memo by Chinese G–292 dated January 14, ’43, in regard to “enemy trained Chosen, Formosan and Manchurian troops” in which is mentioned (a) a report dated November 16, ’42 from General Chen Cheng (Chinese commander in the recent Hupeh–Hunan operations) that the “elite” [Japanese?] troops in the Wuhan area had been replaced by mixed troops of Japs, Koreans, Formosans and Manchurians; (b) that on November 17, ’42 the third Jap division was replenished after the Chekiang–Kiangsi campaign on the basis of 1 Jap, 3 Koreans and 6 Manchurians; (c) that, according to a report from General Chen Cheng dated December 5, ’42, many Manchurians were in the Jap thirty-ninth division (portions of which also took part in the recent fighting); that on January 2, ’43 some 20,000 troops arrived at Chinkiang from the northeast on December 4, ’42 and that about 30 per cent of them were Japs and 70 per cent Manchurians.
It would seem from these reports that considerable numbers of Manchurian soldiers intermixed individually or by groups with Jap troops have at some time had station or have operated in Central China. As for the recent campaign, it would seem that the puppet troops engaged therein, as far as they have [been] identified, were Nanking puppets.
- Military Intelligence.↩