893.20/786
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the
Secretary of State
No. 1254
Chungking, June 12,
1943.
[Received July 3.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of
conversation of May 18 between Mr. Vincent and General Hsiung Shih-hui,
recently head of the Chinese Military Mission to the United States and
probable new head of the National Planning Board. Mr. Vincent suggested that
this memorandum might be held until General Hsiung’s appointment should be
gazetted, but it is believed that it is of sufficient
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interest to send it forward without further delay,
whether or not General Hsiung actually receives the appointment in
question.
As pointed out in the memorandum, the reported decision of the Generalissimo
to appoint General Hsiung as head of the National Planning Board is another
indication of General Chiang’s determination to make China militarily strong
and self-sufficient and of the Kuomintang’s cynical attitude toward the
possibility of a real “new order” after the present war.
Incidentally, General Hsiung is reported to be, following his return from the
United States, strongly anti-American and to have developed an inclination
to align himself with members of the so-called “Peace Party” who favor
making an endeavor at some appropriate time to come to terms with the
Japanese.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of
Embassy in China (Vincent)
[Chungking,] May 18, 1943.
General Hsiung Shih-hui was at last evening’s Foreign Office dinner and
having learned confidentially that he is to replace Dr. Wang Shih-chieh
as head of the National Planning Board, I took the occasion privately to
congratulate him and to comment on the importance of the post because of
the need for constructive post-war planning on a broad scale. During the
conversation I remarked that, in my opinion, the great problems of
China’s development, in the order of their importance, were: improvement
of agriculture, finance, communications and industry. General Hsiung
took immediate exception, saying that China’s first problem was military
security particularly in the north; and that that was the reason the
Generalissimo was putting him, a military man, at the head of the Board
in the place of the present civilian.
This decision is another indication of the Generalissimo’s determination,
shown in his recent book, China’s Destiny, to
make China militarily strong and self-sufficient, and of the
Kuomintang’s disillusioned attitude toward the possibility of a real
“new order” after the present war. There is a general distrust and
suspicion of Russia and an expectation that China and Russia will find
themselves in conflicting positions in the post-war period.
