893.24/1655
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are most anxious to do all in their power to assist the Chinese Government to obtain the non-military supplies which they require in order to maintain their war effort and have lately been considering whether there were any steps which could usefully be taken to facilitate the flow of such supplies to China. Hitherto the difficulties of transportation have greatly limited the amount of non-military supplies which it has been possible actually to deliver to China. However the increase in the carrying capacity of air transport between India and China and the prospect that it may at a not too distant date, be possible to deliver up to 1,700 tons of goods by the overland route, should, it is to be hoped, enable appreciably larger quantities of such stores to reach China in the future.
In any case it is to be anticipated that the Chinese authorities, encouraged by the prospect of improved methods of transportation, will endeavour to obtain very considerable quantities of non-military stores from the United States and to a lesser extent from the United Kingdom and other sources of supply. It will, however, be some time before the transportation position can be improved to any very appreciable extent and indeed, until a radical change in the military situation takes place it is to be feared that transportation facilities will always be inadequate to carry all the non-military supplies which the Chinese Government would wish to obtain.
In these circumstances, His Majesty’s Government feel that it is very desirable that some kind of machinery should be set up with the object of ensuring that the delivery of Chinese goods to India (where there are said to be at the moment 75,000 tons of Chinese supplies lying awaiting transport) should be appropriately related to the capacity for on-carriage to China. Otherwise there is the risk of serious congestion and disorganisation occurring and of goods deteriorating through lack of storage space. His Majesty’s Government also think it would be very helpful if some machinery were established which would make it easier to ensure that the goods actually procured for and furnished to China were those best calculated to be of immediate value. For example, 100 tons of spare parts or of scarce materials to enable Chinese industrial plants to continue operations might be of greater benefit to China than the shipment of a far larger quantity of finished goods. Finally, some machinery seems necessary to ensure that supplies agreed to be furnished to China from the United States or the United Kingdom are made available [Page 504] and delivered in order of importance and urgency. His Majesty’s Government feel that the creation of some such machinery would not only be of great assistance to the Chinese Government, but would also be of real value to the United States and United Kingdom Governments, in that it would assure the co-ordinated placing of orders in the two countries and would facilitate the economical use of their production and shipping resources.
With this object, His Majesty’s Government suggest the early setting-up of an Anglo-American “screen” at Chungking, consisting of one United States officer and one British officer—possibly from their respective Embassies—who would have the right to co-opt others as necessary. The Chinese Government would of course be represented on this body. Their representation could either be direct or through a liaison officer. This “screen” would, in fact, closely resemble the British-American-Co-ordinating Committee at Ankara and it is suggested that the procedure adopted in the case of Turkey should be followed as far as is practicable. All Chinese requirements of non-military supplies from abroad, except those from the U. S. S. R., but including those from India, should be notified to the proposed body for “screening”. Orders approved by the “screen” would be submitted simultaneously to Washington and London. The authorities in London would await the comments of the United States authorities before arranging any procurement action as far as they were concerned.
It would, of course, be essential that the Chinese Government should approve of the setting-up of the “screen” and should agree to co-operate in the proper procedure. It is to be hoped, however, that they would be prepared to agree since this proposal would provide the means whereby early recognition could be given to their essential current and future needs and arrangements made to ensure proper priority being given to their most urgent requirements.
If this proposal is acceptable to the United States Government in principle, it would of course be necessary for the British and American authorities to work out the detailed instructions and terms of reference for the Chungking “screen”. Its primary purpose would, however, be, as explained above, to control production of non-military supplies to China so as to ensure that the delivery of goods to India was related to the onward transport capacity and that the goods were delivered in order of their importance to the Chinese war effort.
His Majesty’s Government trust that these proposals will commend themselves to the United States Government and that the latter will be prepared to join with them in making the appropriate representations to the Chinese Government.