Intelligence Report by the Naval Attaché in China (Brown)67
Comment: The following memorandum was prepared by a member of this office in close contact with certain responsible officials.
To a considerable extent it confirms what the Naval Attaché has observed to be the opinion of a considerable cross-section of officialdom, although perhaps not as frankly expressed as set forth here.
Chinese Official’s Opinion of the Advantages of a Chiang–Roosevelt Meeting
In conversation with one of the officials who is very close to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, he said he failed to understand the reason why no effort had been made to arrange a meeting between Generalissimo Chiang and President Roosevelt. Much publicity and importance had been given to the Churchill–Roosevelt parley. He frankly expressed his belief that it was the intention of the United Nations to crush Hitler in Europe before they come to China’s assistance and that it might be that the leaders of the United Nations regard the China front as unimportant and that the Chinese are capable of carrying on the war against the Japanese invaders indefinitely and that a little delay would not seriously jeopardize her position. He, in a way, admitted that this is probably the best plan and that the leaders of the United Nations are doing everything possible to help win the war. He even went so far as to express his opinion that failure of President Roosevelt to invite Chiang Kai-shek to a conference might be attributed to the fact that the Allied Leaders regard China as an inferior power and that no possible advantage could be gained by such a meeting.
When assured that that was not the case and that everything is being worked out and will be carried out when the time is ripe and that all military strategy must be kept secret until the time [is] ripe to execute them, he acknowledged the soundness of the plan and he hinted that a Chiang–Roosevelt meeting would serve to bolster up the ebbing morale of the Chinese people. He stated that before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Chinese morale was at its lowest and on the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Chinese people looked forward to better days and that more help would be given China by the United States and other Allies. The loss of Burma and the closing of the Burma Road was a serious blow to Chinese morale and with the lapse of almost one and one half years, during which time only a fraction of Lease Lend materials trickled into China by air transport, Chinese morale took [Page 55] another downward dive. He pointed out that a Chiang–Roosevelt meeting, even if nothing important is discussed other than a friendly exchange of greetings, would enhance Chinese morale to such an extent that it would be even better than all the Lease-Lend materials the United States could get into China. If such a meeting could be brought about at the invitation of President Roosevelt, Chinese officials and the Chinese populace would be made to realize that at least such powerful nations as the United States recognize that China still has a place, if not an equal place, in the ranks of the Allied Council, and on the strength of this, China would gain politically and financially. Restoration of confidence that help is within the horizon would tend to cause merchants and traders to reflect that with Allied financial and material backings the day would not be far off when goods would be flowing freely and in abundance into blockaded China. If the people can be brought into this frame of mind, confidence in the strength of Chinese currency would prevail and prices of various commodities would automatically be lowered.
He admitted that Chiang could have asked for such a conference but that he refrained from doing so on account of “face”, which is still the predominating force in the Chinese political and social world.
- Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.↩