Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

893.24/1482: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

Chungking, January 5, 1943—1 p.m.
[Received 4:57 p.m.]

16. From Alsop,² for Stettinius,³ Lend-Lease. Orchard⁴ only: Following is summary of situation here based on careful exploration with General Stilwell,⁵ Dr. Soong,⁶ Embassy, other relevant authorities.

1. Preparations now underway for Burma campaign to be launched at specified date. These preparations plus requirements of Air Force are using every pound of every ton Air Transport Command can carry. Military pressure for space on air transports into China will increase geometrically until China operation finishes. With most minor exceptions none of our goods have slightest chance of being brought into China by air in wartime.

2. Northwest highway via Iran, Russia and Sinkiang seems increasingly dubious means of bringing substantial quantities of goods into China. Adequacy of existing transport facilities through Iran now in grave doubt. Chinese authorities taking position that in any case highway should primarily supply armies near Sian although prospect these will soon fight Japanese is most remote. Finally General Stilwell privately informs me he will probably have to take for his own uses most trucks intended for northwest highway.

3. Betting even, Burma offensive cannot be immediately initiated. Delay will entail further wait for monsoon season deferring action until January 1944. If begun tomorrow fighting will require several months and many months thereafter will be used in building or reconditioning approaches to Burma and Lashio and reconditioning Burma Road proper.

Estimated minimum interval from initiation of offensive to delivery first goods in Kunming 10 months and 12 more probable. Moreover operation of road will be wholly in Army hands and General Stilwell is unshakably determined to carry in nothing not of direct military value. He asserts road will be inadequate supply line even with most stringent restrictions.

4. Under circumstances feel strongly that reconsideration of our China program is urgently desirable. Many items intended for wartime use in China cannot possibly be imported. Conversely have learned of need for certain categories of items which will be approved for wartime importation and should be sponsored by Lend-Lease but are not in program. Had hoped carry work through primary stages here with aid of data requested in my number 1539, December 23⁷ but am now fully convinced this impossible owing my lack background and almost total ignorance of all civilian Lend-Lease projects among General Stilwell’s staff. Moreover feel questions of policy involved too serious and farreaching for me to handle without prior consultation with you. Think satisfactory policy can be laid down and machinery organized to implement it with reasonable ease after consultation but consider consultation absolutely necessary prerequisite.

5. Therefore convinced should return promptly to Washington for consultation. Have talked with Doctor Soong, General Stilwell and Embassy and all agree this is wisest course. Doctor Soong has offered me place in his plane if he returns soon. Impossible summarize situation adequately in cable but earnestly hope you will accept my recommendation. In any case am positive usefulness here nil until after Washington talks. Consequently trust response will be early and favorable. Also request authority return by Army transport if Doctor Soong’s departure delayed as his plans most indefinite. Regards. [Alsop.]

Gauss

2. Joseph W. Alsop, Jr., Chief of Lend-Lease Mission to China.
3. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator.
4. John E. Orchard, Senior Assistant Administrator, Lend-Lease Administration.
5. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China, Burma, and India.
6. T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
7. Not printed.