793.94/17108: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Vincent) to the Secretary of State
[Received 12:15 p.m.]
515. I have had a discussion with Acting Foreign Minister58 in regard to the subject of Department’s 428, April 1, 6 p.m. He states that Chinese Government is not now concerned regarding Japan’s “new China policy” in occupied China and I find other Chinese officials of like mind. He described Japan’s “new China policy” as one of appeasement. He cites as significant Tojo’s recent address [to] Jap residents in Shanghai, when he instructed them to treat Chinese as equals and as brothers other than as conquered people, and the action, presumably taken on Tojo’s instructions, in changing Jap special service officers in China into liaison officers for maintenance of relations with Chinese officials. The appeasement policy, he states, is not now a matter for concern but if the war in the Far East is prolonged and if as a result Chinese in occupied areas become disheartened this policy might prove effective. He states that Japan, with the large resources now at its command, is growing stronger and that there is a very real danger that Chinese in occupied China may become impressed with this fact and be influenced by the appeasement policy to the point that they may cooperate with the Japs. With regard to increased use of puppet troops by Japan, he states that situation is not perturbing, [Page 49] that Japs must still maintain close surveillance of puppet troops but that those troops may be influenced in their attitude by the circumstances outlined above.
I incline to the belief that Dr. Wu’s views are a reflection in some measure of recent discussions in Executive Yuan Cabinet meetings and possibly in the Supreme National Defense Council. The connection made between possible effectiveness of Jap appeasement in occupied China and the feeling that the war is being unnecessarily prolonged because of Allied concentration on the European rather than the Pacific theatre of the war is obviously another attempt to put forward Chinese claim for active operations in the Pacific theatre. However, I feel that, rightly or wrongly, there is a degree of sincerity behind the views expressed.
The Chief of military intelligence, expressing his views without knowledge of the views outlined above by Acting Foreign Minister told me that the Jap appeasement policy had come too late to be effective among the civilian population in occupied China and that there was little to be feared from increase in puppet troops. He said that there had been no defections of military or such officials from here to the Nanking régime but admitted that some Chinese officials in minor positions and businessmen had, for family reasons, recently found their way back to Shanghai and that some Chinese of prominence in occupied areas had been forced to appear to join the Nanking régime. He said that Chinese here were not impressed with Tojo’s recent attempts to give face to Wang Ching-wei.
While recognizing that the development of Jap policy in occupied China cannot be lightly dismissed as insignificant, I do not feel that it is cause for serious concern.
- K. C. Wu, Chinese Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩