From time to time I expect to prepare other brief memoranda on various
problems confronting us in East Asia and shall send you copies.
Should you wish to discuss Far Eastern Questions with experts in Washington,
I have two names to suggest: John Carter Vincent and Laurence Salisbury.
Vincent’s name, I recall, you knew. He is now with FEA. Salisbury is a
Japanese language officer, as Bohlen is Russian and I Chinese. He has served
in both Japan and China, investigated on special orders from the State
Department the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and until a month or two
before Pearl Harbor served as political adviser to Sayre in Manila. He has
since been Assistant Chief of the Far Eastern Division, handling Japanese
and Korean matters.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Davies)
[Extracts]
Chiang Kai Shek and China
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Japan’s attack caught China in mid-passage between semi-feudalism and
modern statehood. External pressure in the form of Japanese aggression
imposed a temporary unity on the various elements struggling to
determine whether China was to develop along democratic or authoritarian
lines. Public pressure compelled Chiang, who was the strongest of these
elements, to become the symbol of a unified national will. The internal
conflict was suspended.
This situation continued so long as the Japanese attempted to bring China
to its knees by military means. But after the fall of Hankow in 1938 the
war entered a period of military stagnation which has continued until
now. Japan adopted instead a shrewd policy of political and economic
offensives designed to bring about Chinese disintegration and collapse.
Confronted with this new Japanese tactic, which promised him some
respite at the expense of other Chinese elements, Chiang chose to
abandon Chinese unity and retrogressed to his pre-war position as a
Chinese militarist seeking to dominate rather than unify and lead.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Because his Kuomintang the centrifugal forces in China are growing under
prolonged economic
[Page 399]
strain and
because the Soviet Union may join the war against Japan and enter
Manchuria and North China, the Generalissimo faces next year the gravest
crisis of his career.
What form and course the crisis will take is impossible to predict.
Certain contributory factors, however, are clear. One is the
increasingly independent attitude of the Chinese Communists, who now say
that they no longer fear Chungking. “If Chiang wants to commit suicide
on us, that suits us.” Another is the accelerating economic
disintegration. A third is the growing restiveness of certain provincial
and military factions. Any one or a combination of these may be
sufficient to accomplish Chiang’s downfall.
By reversing his policy of sixteen years’ standing, reforming the
Kuomintang and taking the lead in a genuine united front, Chiang could
surely survive the crisis. But the Generalissimo is not only personally
incapable of this, he is a hostage of the corrupt forces he
manipulates.
In this uncertain situation we should avoid committing ourselves’
unalterably to Chiang, We should be ready during or after the war to
adjust ourselves to possible realignments in China, We should wish, for
example, to avoid finding ourselves at the close of the war backing a
coalition of Chiang’s Kuomintang and the degenerate puppets against a
democratic coalition commanding Russian sympathy.
The adoption of a more realistic policy toward Chiang Kai-shek does not
mean abandonment of our objectives (1) to capitalize during the war on
China’s position on the Japanese flank, and (2) to build up after the
war a strong and independent China. On the contrary, it will mean that
we shall be more likely to achieve these objectives. A realistic policy
toward Chiang would be based on (1) recognition by us that the
Generalissimo is highly susceptible to firm coordinated American
pressure, (2) stern bargaining (in consultation with American
representatives in China) and (3) readiness to support a strong new
coalition offering cooperation mutually more beneficial to China and the
United States.
New Delhi, December 31,
1943.
