740.0011 Pacific War/3193
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
There has been growing in my mind for several weeks past a sense of a possibility that long before the time at which, proceeding according to the strategy which has been adopted of defeating Germany first and then dealing with the Japanese, the time will have arrived for the United Nations to attack Japan from points in China, we will find that, in regard to our expectation of using air fields in China, especially fields near the coast, for that attack, we have “missed the boat.” I am not sure that such a situation has not already developed.
There come to our attention increasing indications that the Chinese have lost or are losing interest in the idea of further sacrificing on their part toward effecting defeat of Japan. The process of “conciliation” and “pacification” in the occupied areas is proceeding steadily. Trade, directly or indirectly encouraged by the Japanese, between the occupied and the unoccupied areas is increasing. Japanese pressure upon officialdom at Chungking through pressure upon Chinese in Japanese hands seems to be having an effect. Nationalist sentiment, various prejudices, some real and some fancied grievances, some suspicions and some apprehensions—toward and in regard to some of China’s allies in the United Nations group tend to create an apathy among officials at Chungking in regard to the subject of offensive military operations against Japan, in view, first, of the fact that the Japanese are no longer pressing them and are given to striking only when struck, and, second, that the United States and Great Britain [Page 44] have declared that they intend to consummate an utter defeat of Japan.
Under these circumstances, it is by no means certain that at a time when, say, nine months or twelve months or eighteen months from now, we might wish to use Chinese air fields for direct offensives against Japan we will find those air fields available.
There is only one way in which we can effectively oppose, offset and counter the policy which Japan is now following in China and the present trend of Chinese thought with regard to the war: the one and only potentially effective measure that we (and the British) have available to us for that purpose lies in the realm of increasing the delivery of materials of war—specifically, planes, guns, trucks, miscellaneous munitions, medicines—and, along with these, personnel, for current and future reinforcing of the Chinese military machine and our own military forces in China. The Chinese are thinking with their eyes, their hands, their feet, their tired bodies and their empty pocket books, rather than with their ears. What is needed in China for the purposes of the United Nations today is visible and tangible evidence of intention and capacity on the part of the United States and Great Britain to make use of China’s potentialities in and as a part of the United Nations war effort. It could be done. C. N. A. C.50 and the Army have demonstrated that.
- China National Aviation Corporation.↩