761.93/1744
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
No. 1962
Chungking, December 27,
1943.
[Received January 12, 1944.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s
despatch No. 1929, December 20, 1943,11 entitled “Political Developments in Sinkiang, 1942–43”
and to enclose a copy of despatch No. 71, December 3, 1943, from the Consul
at Tihwa in regard to Sino-Soviet relations in Sinkiang.
This despatch, which includes an adequate summary of its contents, contains
background information on political developments in Sinkiang during the
period prior to that covered in Mr. Clubb’s despatch No. 60, November 1,
194311 (our despatch
under reference). The Embassy has found the enclosed despatch to be of
considerable interest and value, and believes that Mr. Clubb deserves
commendation for it, more especially as it reflects the extensive knowledge
of the political background in Sinkiang which he acquired during the eight
months of his station there.
Respectfully yours,
[Page 394]
[Enclosure—Extract]
The Consul at Tihwa (Clubb) to the
Ambassador in China (Gauss)
No. 71
Tihwa, December 3,
1943.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch
No. 60 of November 1, 194312 reviewing political developments in Sinkiang during
the period 1942–3, and to enclose in English translation a copy of an
article12 on “The
Victory of the Last Six Years’ Policy of the Sinkiang Government of
Friendship Toward the Soviet Union” as written by Major-General Li
Ying-ch’i, head of the Sinkiang Police Bureau, and published in the
magazine Fan Ti Chan Hsien (Anti-Imperialist
Front) of November 7, 1939; and to review briefly those aspects of
recent Sinkiang history bearing upon the particular matter of the
province’s relationships to the U.S.S.R.
Summary: Police Chief Li Ying-ch’i and
Defense Commissioner Sheng Shih-ts’ai are in agreement in their
pre-Kuomintang-era assertions that the U.S.S.R. had no aggressive
designs regarding Sinkiang but contrariwise had extended spiritual
and material aid to the province. It appears to be a fact that
Sinkiang derived benefit from trade with the U.S.S.R., and from the
despatch of Soviet technicians and advisers, the extension of
credits, and the occasional granting of military assistance, at a
time when all were needed. General Sheng, by the evidence,
established himself in power in Sinkiang largely independent from
the Kuomintang power at Nanking. In 1934, 1936 and 1937 Soviet
Russian military forces in the guise of émigré Russians assisted General Sheng in the suppression
of revolts against his rule; and in the year 1937, after both the
suppression of that year’s Uighur rebellion and the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War, Soviet troops went into garrison at Hami, still
in the same guise. The Chinese side has stated that the function of
the garrison was really to prevent Moslem General Ma Pu-fang’s from
linking up with Sinkiang Moslem forces, the Soviet side has stated
that its function was with relation to Sino-Japanese hostilities
(implication: a Soviet move of self-defense): each side may have had
its individual aim, with accord reached on the basis of some tacit
understanding reached as early as 1934—with the National Government
in the then circumstances perhaps even acquiescing in the
arrangement. Soviet Russian “intentions” vis-à-vis Sinkiang during
the period of General Sheng’s rule, viewed against the background of
world events and Soviet policies of the time, appear to have been in
fact non-aggressive as stated by the quoted Chinese leaders. End of Summary.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Respectfully yours,
