893.00/15203
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 10.]
Sir: Referring to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1764 of November 2, 1943, in regard to the military strength of the Chinese Communists, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a report dated November 16, 1943,95 prepared by the Military Attaché in regard to the armed forces of the Chinese Communists.
Summary: Recent transfers of Central Government troops to the Northwest (Embassy’s despatch No. 1807 of November 1296) appear to be directly associated with the problem of Kuomintang-Communist relations and can be interpreted as strong evidence that the Central Government does not intend to rely upon “political means” alone as a solution of this problem.
Information regarding the Chinese Communist forces is, therefore, of importance. These forces are divided into three categories: regular military forces, guerrilla forces and local militia. Regular military forces consist of the 18th Group Army under General Chu Teh and the New Fourth Army under General Chen Yi, together with two independent groups, one in Kwangtung and the other on Hainan Island. Although the 18th Group Army is supposed to be composed of three divisions numbering about 30,000 men, it is reported actually to number 320,000. Its headquarters are at Yenan, the capital of the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Region, the most important of the twelve “regions” north of the Lunghai Railway garrisoned by the 18th Group Army in north China. The New Fourth Army, which ceased officially to exist after its disbandment by the Central Government in 1941, is said to have a strength of 120,000 men in seven divisions and to be better equipped than the 18th Group Army due to its greater activity against the Japanese and the puppets and the consequent capture of matériel from those sources. The New Fourth Army has its headquarters at Yiencheng, Kiangsu, and operates in central and eastern [Page 383] China south of the Lunghai Railway. The Chinese Communists claim to have a navy composed of hundreds of sampans and junks along the Kiangsu coast serving in transportation of supplies. Communists claim a total guerrilla force of 1,000,000 men but it is not believed that the figure exceeds 400,000. Local militia units, said by the Communists to number 1,000,000 men, are estimated at approximately 600,000.
As a composite military force the Chinese Communists are not capable of much, if any, offensive action as their regular units, while well trained and well led, are very poorly armed. The principal arm is the rifle, supplemented by some few automatic rifles, some machine guns, not much artillery (and still less ammunition), no tanks, no planes and a small number of almost worn out trucks. Their strength lies in guerrilla activity.
The present dispositions of the Communist forces, together with their considerable training and leadership, would enable them very easily to move into the north China areas if the Japanese should withdraw, and the movement of Central Government troops toward the Communist areas may be intended to prevent such action. In the event of actual hostilities the Communists could probably muster no more than 600,000 men, a force which would, however, require at least 1,000,000 Central Government troops to oppose them. At present the numerical ratio between the Communists and the Central Government, taking all factors into consideration, can reasonably be placed at 1 to 1, but with the continued receipt of further equipment from China’s allies the Central Government’s superiority will be vastly increased. At present the problem of Kuomintang-Communist relations is a very serious one which approaches a showdown as the war goes on and the reported Chungking troop concentrations in the Northwest make the situation ominous. End of Summary.
Another factor in the Kuomintang-Communist situation which cannot be ignored in the event of a civil war is the possible support the Communists might receive from elements other than those in the present Communist-occupied areas. Potential strength lies in the conditions of the peasants, who comprise about 80 percent of the population. Opposition on the part of the peasants to conscription methods, enforced labor, military requisitions, heavy taxation in kind and official corruption is widespread and during the past year has taken the form of armed revolt in several provinces. Peasants are unorganized, lack leaders and are not politically’ conscious, but if the internal administration should become chaotic or if the Kuomintang should attack the Communists, the latter will not only be in a position to capitalize on this agrarian discontent but will be certain to endeavor to spread the movement. Central Government measures for dealing with these local revolts have done little more than increase the hostility of the peasants toward the Central Government and have not achieved a fundamental solution of the problem by removing the causes of complaint. It may be said that the economic condition of the country and [Page 384] the widespread agrarian discontent create fertile ground for Communist propaganda and that strong opposition to civil war is believed to be entertained by almost all Chinese, excepting the more rabid Kuomintang members. These factors do not indicate that a Kuomintang attempt to solve the Communist problem by military force at present would be the easy task envisaged by some of the more rabid anti-Communist elements in the Kuomintang. It is, therefore, disquieting that the Kuomintang should on the one hand announce a “political solution” of the Communist problem (Embassy’s despatch No. 1675 of October 14) and form a committee for the establishment of constitutional goverment after the war (which, as reported in our despatch no. 1747, October 28, is criticized by the minority parties as being, like the People’s Political Council, a Kuomintang dominated organ) and on the other hand continue the movement of additional troops to the Communist areas in the Northwest.97
Respectfully yours,
- Latter not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Chinese Affairs stated in a memorandum dated February 21, 1944, that “The Military Attaché’s report, together with the comments in the Embassy’s covering despatch (no. 1842), probably provides the clearest picture of the Communists’ strength yet received in the Department.”↩