893.796/318
Memorandum by the Ambassador in China ( Gauss ), Temporarily in the United States, to the Adviser on Political Relations ( Hornbeck )
I have carefully refrained in China from mixing into our military affairs; they are the duty and responsibility of General Stilwell; but, returning home on leave, I feel that I should mention a matter which has both military and political aspects of some importance—the use of the Chinese air corps pilots trained in the United States.
We are bringing several hundred Chinese air corps cadets to the United States annually for advanced training after which they are returned to China and, apparently, have been lost to the war effort. They go into the Chinese air corps under commanders who have not had American training and become more or less inactive. They do not go on from their advanced American training to actual battle experience which they could get in China alongside our own air force; battle experience which would develop them into squadron leaders and assist in building up an efficient Chinese air arm which would be of use to China and of benefit to the United States during the war.
I spoke briefly to General Arnold on this subject when he was in Chungking, and I had the impression that the matter was in his opinion worthy of consideration. It was my thought that these pilots after return to China should be brigaded with or alongside our own air force under General Chennault, receive battle experience with them, develop their own squadron leaders, and contribute something to the war effort.
I have also talked with Dr. T. V. Soong on the subject, both in Chungking and here, and I am told that China would welcome our interest in developing these pilots and in reorganizing the Chinese air force; and I gain the impression that it would be agreeable to the Chinese if these pilots were brigaded with our air force along some such lines as I have suggested above.
When I passed through Kunming on my way home I saw General Chennault and asked him what had been done in the matter. He told me frankly that he had been told by his superior officer (General [Page 42] Stilwell) not to concern himself in it. Chennault told me that he would like to see these Chinese pilots brigaded alongside his own force, perhaps with American squadron leaders as I have suggested until the Chinese develop their own squadron leaders out of their own contingents, or, he said, his own fliers would gladly agree to the Chinese pilots being mixed into their squadrons.
How efficiently and successfully this could be done I do not know, but it seems to me that if any benefit is to come, to us and to China, out of our air corps training program for China something should be done—soon—to make proper use of these American trained Chinese pilots; and the best man to make use of them is Chennault.
I have no comment to make on the friction which apparently exists between Chennault and some of his higher military colleagues. I can only say this: Chennault has the complete confidence of the Chinese Government and leaders; he has accomplished wonders with only a handful of planes and pilots; he has produced results in the face of charges that his tactics are unorthodox, etc., etc.; and it would seem to me that having in mind our one objective—winning the war—it would be wise to make all possible use of Chennault in this matter of the Chinese pilots (and indeed, other matters affecting relations between the Chinese and the American forces) if we want results.
Confidentially, my conclusion is that the Chinese air corps training program is a failure unless we take these Chinese pilots after their training in the United States, give them battle experience alongside our own air corps, develop Chinese squadron leaders (in short, build up a new Chinese air corps), and get some benefit—for China and for ourselves—out of the program. If we can develop these Chinese pilots in Chennault tactics and make them an effective force we need send less of our own American pilots to China.