893.00/15119: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 13—8:10 p.m.]
1695. During a private conversation Wu Teh-chen, Secretary General of CEC, who has been very friendly, asked me what our people at home thought of China’s internal problems. I said there was considerable concern over the continuingly deteriorating economic situation notwithstanding American efforts to be of assistance through credits, stabilization loans and now through supply of gold for free sale and that some quarters wondered why Chinese Government could not control important factors such as hoarding to keep down food costs which were adversely affecting China’s soldiers as well as others. I said there was concern over apparent lack of interest in various Chinese quarters in increasing and making more effective China’s war effort; there was concern over the Kuomintang-Communist differences, over the numerous and apparently increasing Fascist trends (some of which I described) and consequent weakening of practical democracy. I mentioned the increasing restrictions on travel by an increasing surveillance of foreigners.
Wu passed over the economic questions, said CEC meeting with its contingent gathering of military leaders had been giving discussion to military situation and inquired as to our attitude toward the Communist situation. I replied that it has always been one of the fundamentals of American policy in Far East that there should be a strong united China; that we accordingly viewed with concern any serious dissension among Chinese people which might militate against establishment and maintenance of a strong unified China especially now as the present differences weakened China’s war effort by causing the immobilization in northwest of large numbers of some of China’s best troops who might better be in Yunnan or on some active front and that the result was that neither these Government troops nor Communist troops being blockaded by them were fighting the Japs.
Wu replied readily that this was so and that it was most unfortunate that the situation kept some 20 divisions of good troops including mechanized troops from actively fighting the Japs and he launched into a defense of Government’s “necessary” position vis-à-vis the Communists, emphasizing the valid contention that no national government could tolerate the maintenance by one group of a separate and independent government and army of its own. He said CEC was planning to “appeal” to Communists to keep their 1937 promises in hope of resolving the question.
[Page 335]He passed over Fascist question with statement that some things were necessary in wartime but China would never become Fascist as the people were fundamentally democratic.
I then told him of surveillance and passport difficulties encountered by Americans at Lanchow, of our recent difficulties in getting a visa for Sprouse43 to make a courier trip there, of the experience of Rice44 who before proceeding to his new post at Lanchow had requested usual provincial visas but could obtain a visa for travel only to Lanchow. I said we had hoped that with abolition of extraterritoriality such travel restrictions would be lifted rather than increased and that American officials and other nationals would be accorded in China same generous facilities and treatment accorded Chinese officials and citizens in the United States. Wu said that most certainly this situation should be rectified, that he was very glad I had told him of this and that he would see if he could not do something about it.
He added that he hoped we would talk together much more frequently in future and invited me to come to him at any time.