893.00/15137
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 9.]
Sir: There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated September 2, 1943,42 submitted by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary of Embassy attached to the staff of General Stilwell, reporting statements made by General Teng Pao-shan, Commander of the Central Government’s 22nd Group Army with headquarters at Yulin, Shensi, to General Stilwell regarding Kuomintang-Communist relations.
Summary of memorandum. The recent tension between the Central Government forces and Communist troops in the Shensi border areas was due to a misunderstanding, the Chungking troops sent to that area being merely replacements instead of reinforcements as feared by the Communists. With respect to the war against Japan, the situation is fundamentally bad as no effective military action can be taken against the Japanese either in north China or in Inner Mongolia by either faction until military cooperation is achieved. The people in the Communist areas have benefitted by the democratic reforms instituted there and the improved conditions of government. Their morale and that of the Communist troops is good. Because of the strategic importance of north China, it would be desirable for the United States to have American military observers in that area in order to obtain more complete over-all information regarding the Japanese and to bring about needed military cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists, with the possible result of causing the Central Government forces to give attention to military matters rather than to political ones as is true at present. End of summary.
With regard to the question of military cooperation, General Teng admits that the present state of virtual immobilization of the forces of both the Communist and the Central Government troops in the border areas has created a fundamentally unsound situation and that, while complete reconciliation between the two factions appears at present to be unattainable, limited cooperation in the military sphere alone might be possible if the Kuomintang can be made to realize the importance of united military action against the Japanese.
General Teng explains that the stationing of American military observers in north China, both in the Communist and in adjacent areas, would also indicate to the Central Government the importance the United States attaches to the north China front, and he is of the opinion that their presence might not only result in causing Central Government forces to devote themselves to military rather than political matters but might at the same time provide assurance to the [Page 330] Communists that their forces engaged in fighting the Japanese would not be stabbed in the back by the Central Government troops.
With reference to the possibility of a settlement of Kuomintang-Communist differences, General Teng expresses the opinion that the Communists are willing to accept Kuomintang terms in principle but that they are not convinced of Kuomintang sincerity in regard to the safeguarding of the democratic and governmental gains affected by the Communists in their areas and in the maintenance intact of the experienced and effective Communist guerrilla troops if placed under Kuomintang commanders. He has urged General Chiang Kai-shek, who, he states, desires to preserve peace between the two factions, to send impartial observers to the Communist areas who can give a fair report of conditions there.
Mr. Service states in the memorandum that the emphasis given by General Teng to the desirability of stationing American military observers in north China appears to indicate that it was this subject which was the primary purpose for his interview with General Stilwell, the call having been arranged on General Teng’s initiative. (It is interesting that this suggestion that American military observers be stationed in north China has previously come from Communist sources (Embassy’s telegram No. 654, May 6, 10 a.m.) and that this is the first occasion, so far as the Embassy is aware, on which Central Government military authorities have recommended such action.)
General Teng is described to the Embassy by Kuomintang critics at Chungking as being of liberal tendencies and as sympathetic toward the Communists. It is unlikely, however, that he is altogether viewed in that light by the Kuomintang in as much as he is entrusted with the leadership of Chungking forces which form the northern side of the blockade maintained around the Communist areas in Shensi and Kansu. Communist sources at Chungking state that General Teng is dependent chiefly on the Communist areas for food supplies for his troops, which may account in part for his more sympathetic attitude toward the Communists. It is also said that he has been summoned to Chungking to report on conditions in Suiyuan where there have been disturbances among the Mongols and that he may be named Chairman of the Kansu Provincial Government to succeed the present Chairman, Ku Cheng-lun, who has aroused much opposition among the Kansu population and who has not been successful in controlling the peasant uprisings in that province. General Teng is a native of Kansu, was formerly Military Governor of that province and would be expected to be more acceptable to the Kansu leaders.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩