893.00/15134

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1541

Sir: Referring to the Embassy’s telegram No. 1483, August 16, 5 p.m. in regard to conditions in Communist-controlled areas in north China, there is enclosed a copy of despatch No. 45 of August 16, 1943,40 from the Secretary on detail at Sian which served as the basis for the telegram under reference.

Mr. Drumright describes in his despatch a conversation with Mr. Gustav Soderbom, a Swedish subject who has long resided in Inner Mongolia and Peiping and who arrived at Sian in early August after a month’s residence at Yenan en route from Peiping to Chungking.

According to Mr. Soderbom, the Chinese Communists control large areas in Hopei and Shansi provinces although they are not active militarily because of a lack of matériel. Their chief source of arms at present is the Japanese-occupied areas where military supplies are purchased from Chinese gun-runners and smuggled into Communist areas. Capture of military equipment from Japanese and Chinese puppet forces, the former source of most of the equipment of the Communist troops, has become increasingly difficult due to lack of military operations as the Japanese are not active in combatting guerrilla operations. The Japanese make only occasional forays into the interior either to seize grain and other loot or to disperse guerrilla [Page 326] concentrations endangering Japanese positions or communications. Communist troops are relatively well fed and clothed and their spirit is excellent. They appear to be on good terms with the people, taxation and labor conscription being carried out in such an equitable manner that little resentment is created among the populace. Proceeds from the sale of opium grown in Communist areas in Shansi are used to bolster Communist revenues, to support the Communist-issued currency and to purchase commodities in the Japanese-occupied areas. Most of the opium appears to be sold or bartered in enemy-controlled areas.

Mr. Soderbom found the atmosphere at Yenan in early July tense due to reports of Chungking troop concentrations in areas surrounding Communist territory. General Chu Teh, commander of the Communist armies, and General Chou En-lai, Communist Party representative at Chungking who arrived at Yenan on July 15, informed Mr. Soderbom that the Chinese Communist Party would not dissolve and that the Communists would resist any Chungking military attack against them. Speeches by Communist leaders at a mass meeting of 8,000 people at Yenan on July 9, at which Mr. Soderbom was present, were characterized by criticism and defiance of and antagonism toward the Central Government and its policies.

The description given by this eye-witness of conditions in the Communist areas and of the atmosphere prevailing there appears to give further support to the feeling that the Communists will not willingly give up their government and army and that they are prepared to resist with force any armed attack against them by the Central Government. This readiness to resist Chungking also bears out at least partially the contention of the Communists that this was one of the compelling factors which has brought about a lessening of the tension between the Communists and the Central Government (Embassy’s telegram No. 1325, July 28, 6 p.m.).

At the height of the tension between the Communists and the Kuomintang there appeared in the Chinese press in various cities in Free China demands, evidently Kuomintang-inspired, by cultural bodies and other organizations for the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party (Embassy’s telegrams No. 1240, July 21, 9 a.m. and No. 1489 of August 1741). Many of these articles referred to the dissension created in the Communist Party by the dissolution of the Comintern.

The publication of these articles has ceased within the past two weeks. According to one report, General Pai Chung-hsi brought about the cessation of such articles by informing General Chiang Kai-shek that they were creating an unfavorable impression both in China and abroad. It may also be that the Kuomintang found that this so-called [Page 327] popular demand for the dissolution of the Communist Party did not achieve the expected results. It is interesting to note that this press campaign is similar to that employed at the time of the disbandment of the New Fourth Army (Communist) in 1941.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

[In a memorandum dated October 30, Troy L. Perkins of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs stated: “Mr. Soderbom’s report tends to support the conclusions reached by other foreigners who have recently travelled through the Communist area: The Communists are not active militarily because of a lack of arms; they appear to be on good terms with the people, taxation and labor conscription being carried out in an equitable manner; the opium poppy is grown in Shansi to bolster guerrilla finances; and the Communists show no signs of acquiescing to Central Government threats or intimidation.” (893.00/15134)]

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