893.24/1553: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Vincent) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:08 p.m.]
400. With reference to Embassy’s 394 of March 18, 3 p.m.,44 Stewart to Office of War Information, I would comment that the reaction I have encountered among Chinese, mostly official, is one of pleasure over America’s reception of Madame Chiang, satisfaction with the conduct of her visit and confidence that, if it can be gotten, Madame Chiang can get it (this latter with regard to Lend-Lease and other forms of aid to China, to recognition of China’s “rightful position” among United Nations, and to Chinese immigration to the United States). Chinese expectations are high at the moment, as stated in my 378, March 16, 4 p.m., in regard to creation of Fourteenth Air Force under Chennault (incidentally there is a tendency to credit Madame Chiang with that development) and there is possibility of adverse reaction if expectations are not fulfilled. Chennault is somewhat perturbed in this respect.
On the general subject of support for China, I believe that material aid given should be conditioned upon the theory that it is as much a good will as a military investment, perhaps more so. It should therefore be given in a form most evident to the public.
Widespread activity on the part of a strong Fourteenth Air Force under Chennault would fulfill this condition ideally and would be a good military investment as well. There may be additional means of serving the same purpose. Equipment and training of a limited number of Chinese troops as in India and Yunnan may be one of them. But what the Chinese describe as all-out material aid to the Chinese Army to enable it to make an all-out offensive to drive the Japanese out of China would not, it seems most evident, be practical; and aid in a limited and dispersed manner would have no positive effect.
The Chinese Army is due all credit for its steadfast resistance to Japan and will no doubt when the Japanese become hard pressed take advantage of the situation but we should not permit our appreciation of those facts to lead us to think that material aid now to the Chinese Army would produce results commensurate with the effort with the cost of its diversion and diversion of the transport from other theaters of the war.
Lastly, while it is good policy to encourage the Chinese in all practical ways, we need not condition our approach to the problem on any fear that the Chinese might lose confidence in our victory and discontinue resistance.
- Not printed.↩