Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

761.90/8–1943

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State³⁵

[Washington,] August 19, 1943.

U.S.S.R. Aims in the Far East

I

The basic aims in the Far East of the Soviet Union do not differ in fundamental character from its aims in Europe, in the Near East, or in other areas adjacent or near to the U.S.S.R. The perhaps primary motivating factor in Soviet policy is a natural desire to promote national security. The economic and political—including security—aspects of Soviet aims in the Far East are closely interwoven.

The Soviet Government has as one of its paramount political objectives the creation ideologically sympathetic governments in nearby areas. As outstanding examples we have the Soviet Union’s infiltration into Outer Mongolia (where a Soviet Government has been created) and its influence in Sinkiang and among the so-called Chinese Communists in northwest China. It is believed that Korean guerrillas operating in Manchuria have close Soviet connections. By virtue of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia would probably be susceptible to Soviet propaganda and infiltration. Reference to the German, Polish, Yugoslavian and other “free” movements sponsored by the Soviet Government should give clear indication of the course which that Government is likely to attempt to follow vis-à-vis China, Korea, Japan and possibly other areas in the Far East, such as Burma, Thailand and the Philippines if and when the Soviet Government feels the time is propitious. The Soviet Government has a deep organic suspicion of any and all non-Soviet governments. This suspicion gives rise to determined efforts to bring neighboring governments and peoples into Soviet Russia’s orbit and actually, if not openly, to exercise control over them. At the same time and for similar reasons, the Soviet Union seeks to influence and, if possible, to gain control of social and economic movements which might be termed revolutionary in the orthodox sense of that term. Movements of this character may be expected to increase in the Far East.

The Soviet Government still has a strong desire for warm water ports. It is to be expected, therefore, that one of its basic objectives in the Far East is to obtain access to the Pacific through a port or ports in north China or in Korea. As a corollary to this objective, we may also expect Soviet Russia to desire transit privileges via the railways across Manchuria to a warm water port or ports and to Vladivostok. It is probable that Soviet Russia would not feel it necessary to annex a warm water port in north China or in Korea provided such port or ports were under a government of which the Russian Government approved and upon which it felt it could rely—in other words, a government more or less similar to that which now exists in Outer Mongolia.

II

So long as the military situation in Europe is such as to require the concentration of practically all of the offensive strength of the U.S.S.R. against Germany, it is probable that the implementation of Soviet policies in the Far East will be confined for the most part to political maneuvering and intrigue, to dissemination of propaganda and to proselyting of Communist disciples. In the meantime the Soviet Government will take full advantage of every possible opportunity to prepare for more positive action in the future. It is difficult to estimate what the situation in Soviet Russia will be after the termination of Russo-German hostilities, and it is correspondingly difficult to estimate the amount of strength which Soviet Russia will then be able to turn toward the Far East. It is reasonable to expect, however, that Soviet Russia will at some time in the future depart from its present policy of not offering material assistance to the Chinese Communists and of not openly opposing the Japanese. An article recently published in a semi-official Soviet journal criticizing the Kuomintang Government of China affords illuminating evidence that the U.S.S.R. is acutely conscious of developments in the Far East. It is most likely that while the Soviet Union remains engaged in Europe on the present scale it will continue to follow a policy of expedient stability in its relations with Japan and of maintaining at least openly a neutral attitude between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang.

One effect of peace in Europe will be to strengthen Soviet Russia’s hand in the Far East.

The degree to which Soviet influence in the Far East will be increased will depend upon a number of factors which must for the present at least remain imponderables. It is to be noted, however, that conditions in the Far East and the policies and programs pursued by China, by Japan and by Western countries will have an important effect upon the development of the position of Soviet Russia in the Far East. In other words, in addition to the positive side of Russian aims, policies and programs, account must also be taken of probable situations and conditions which might further Soviet aims without there being put forth any considerable positive effort on the part of the U.S.S.R. It may be assumed that areas in the Far East where there exist social unrest and political instability, conducive to the type of so-called revolutionary movements mentioned earlier in this memorandum, will furnish fertile fields for the extension of Soviet influence. Such a development need not, and probably will not, have as its aim territorial aggrandizement or even well-defined political objectives on the part of the Soviet Union. It may quite understandably be more in the nature of an attraction on the part of the peoples of those areas to Soviet Russia, because of dissatisfaction with governmental policies and conditions in those areas, than in the nature of a positive move on the part of the Soviet Government. It is well to bear in mind, therefore, that post-war conditions in China and other Far Eastern areas—such as failures to give serious attention to the needs of the people—may be more responsible for political developments in the Far East in which Soviet Russia would be concerned than any policy or initiative taken by the Soviet Government. There will be a natural tendency, however, on the part of the authorities in the area concerned, such as in China, to place the blame for their own failures at the doorstep of Moscow as the instigator of social unrest.

In any post-war settlement which is worked out in the Far East it is to be expected that Soviet Russia will seek to influence that settlement in a way which would facilitate the realization of basic Soviet desiderata set forth in the first section of this memorandum. It is believed that this will be true whether Soviet Russia actively enters the war against Japan or not. The Soviet Union will probably seek to gain control of or to create Sovietized governments among the peoples of Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea and possibly other areas in the Western Pacific; in the matter of influence, Soviet desires would include substantial influence in and over Japan.

Should the Soviet Union, as is likely, enter the war against Japan in its later stages and before Japan’s capitulation, she would probably endeavor to send troops into Manchuria, southern Saghalin and Korea. Were she to achieve this, she would probably make demands for some territorial and/or administrative advantages in those areas for Soviet account; but this is problematical. The Soviet Union would probably demand an important voice at any conference in relation to the settlement of Far Eastern affairs. In any event it is reasonable to expect Soviet Russia to wish to move into areas, if any, in north China and possibly Korea where a political vacuum might have been created by the defeat of Japan.

(The foregoing estimate takes no account of the possibility of a separate peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Should a separate peace be made between these two countries more active Soviet interference in China might well be forthcoming, as well as efforts to bring about peace between Japan and China in order for obvious reasons to prolong Japan’s war with the United States and Great Britain.)

Existing conditions in China and the probable conditions throughout the Far East at the end of the war make it likely that the Soviet Union will be in a strong position toward achieving its fundamental aims in regard to those areas.

35. Drafted by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck), the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine), and Max W. Bishop and John Garter Vincent of the same Division.