761.93/1731
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 1.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s telegram No. 1197, July 16, 10 [8] a.m.27 in regard to the recent change in status of certain Chinese consular offices in the Soviet Union and to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch (no. 17 of July 3, 1943) from the Consulate at Tihwa27 on the general subject of Sinkiang–U. S. S. R. relations.
Mr. Clubb first sets forth in somewhat more detail the information contained in the Embassy’s reference telegram.
He then gives such information as he has been able to obtain in regard to political prisoners in Sinkiang, a subject which he apparently confused with the Department’s inquiry (telegram no. 823, June 29, 5 [3] p.m. to the Embassy) in regard to imprisonment of Chinese nationals in Siberia. Mr. Clubb quotes the estimate of a reliable but not necessarily exactly informed source to the effect that during the past three years about 1,000 persons have been imprisoned in Tihwa for political reasons, including some 300 since August 1942 (the date of the visit to Sinkiang of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek and General Chu Shao-liang). A number of Chinese returned students from Russia and other intellectuals are reportedly included in this latter group. Mr. Clubb makes a “conservative rough estimate” that some 20 Russians and perhaps 40 Chinese (assumably political prisoners) have been released from Tihwa prisons since last August.
In the latter part of his despatch Mr. Clubb discusses at some length Soviet-Sinkiang relations and the political situation in Sinkiang. His observations may be summarized as follows:
[Page 310]It appears probable that the political influence until recently exercised in Sinkiang by the Soviet Union has been somewhat over-estimated due to exaggerated political significance being attached to the stationing of Russian troops at Hami, the presence of Soviet advisors and technicians in the Sinkiang government, the trade relations between Sinkiang and the U. S. S. R., and political imprisonments which seemed to be the result of Soviet influence. The present deterioration in Soviet-Sinkiang relations began in the summer of 1942 when Governor Sheng Shih-tsai, apparently underestimating Russian strength vis-à-vis Germany, and overestimating the potentialities of the Chinese Central Government, found it opportune to re-orient his relationships under circumstances unlikely to increase sympathy between the Soviet Union and either Sinkiang Province or the Central Government.
Mr. Clubb cites instances of political unrest in Sinkiang (in spite of the very strict police control in the province) and points out that the political situation may be expected to worsen with the anticipated deterioration in the provincial economy, a situation which does not point to any increase in the stability of Governor Sheng’s regime or in Central Government influence in Sinkiang. Although he hints that the Soviet Union would not be above taking advantage of the situation, Mr. Clubb thinks it highly improbable that the Russians would, under present circumstances, enter Sinkiang in force in order to set up a regime sympathetic to them.
Respectfully yours,