Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China

740.0011 Pacific War/3406

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1430

Chungking, August 4, 1943.
[Received September 1.]

Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s telegram No. 1325, July 28, 6 p.m., in regard to Kuomintang-Communist developments, there are enclosed:²⁰ (a) a memorandum of conversation with Miss Kung Peng, a member of the editorial staff of the Hsin Hua Jih Pao (Communist-controlled) and part-time secretary to General Chou En-lai, Communist Party representative at Chungking; (&) a summary translation of a circular telegram^* said to have been sent by a mass meeting of the Communist Party at Yenan on July 9; (c) a statement^* released by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on May 26, 1943, in regard to the dissolution of the Comintern; and (d) a translation of a report^* said to have been made by Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Communist Party, at Yenan on May 26 following the dissolution of the Comintern.

Summary. Communists attribute the reported lessening of the tension between Kuomintang and Communist forces in Shensi partly to the belief of the Central Government that the Communists are prepared to resist any armed attack on the Border Region. A circular telegram sent to Central Government leaders on July 9 by a Communist mass meeting at Yenan reiterated Communist desire for unity, resistance to Japan, opposition to civil war and determination to defend the Border Region. Kuomintang claims that the dissolution of the Comintern has severely shaken the unity of the Communist Party are denied by the Communists who assert that the Chinese Communist Party is sufficiently mature to stand alone and that the Comintern has long since ceased to give any but moral support to the Party. There seems to be no likelihood that the differences between the two parties can be settled amicably, and it is believed that neither side is prepared to make the concessions necessary for reaching a settlement of their differences.

There has reportedly been a lessening of the tension between the Central Government and the Communist forces in the Shensi border areas during the past ten days. One of the four reasons to which Miss Kung ascribes this eased tension, as reported in the Embassy’s telegram under reference, is the strong stand taken by the Communist Party at a mass meeting at Yenan on July 9 which convinced the Kuomintang leaders that the Communists were prepared to resist any armed attack on the Border Region. She states that two Kuomintang officials sent to Yenan by the Central Government for liaison work were present at that meeting.

A circular telegram was addressed by this mass meeting to President Lin Sen, General Chiang Kai-shek, the heads of the various Ministries and Yuans, the army officers fighting against the Japanese, the various parties opposing Japan and all compatriots, in which telegram the instigators of the present trouble are said to be Japanese fifth columnists within the Chinese army who are endeavoring to foment civil war. The charge was made that the war against Communism is being given priority over the war against Japan. The telegram then went on to make certain demands and requests of General Chiang and to General Hu Tsung-nan²² for the return of the Central Government troops to their original positions, the maintenance of unity and the avoidance of civil war. The Communists demanded the arrest and public trial of Wu Kai-hsien, calling him a secret envoy of the Japanese. (This former Kuomintang leader at Shanghai, who arrived at Chungking several months ago, was met at the airport by leading Kuomintang officials, including Dr. Chu Chia-hua, the Minister of Organization of the Kuomintang. He reportedly brought with him peace terms from the Japanese. Unconfirmed reports have reached the Embassy that Wu returned to Nanking in late June bearing with him the reply of the Chungking Government. The nature of the alleged terms and reply are not known to the Embassy.) In the telegram demands were also presented for the punishment of the generals of the Central Government armies who have surrendered to the puppet regime, and all parties and patriots were requested to follow the mottoes of the Communist Party: (1) uphold the war of resistance and oppose civil war; (2) maintain unity; (3) oppose the transfer of Central Government troops to the Border Region and send these troops against the Japanese; (4) punish the organizations which are inciting civil war; (5) support the Communist Party and defend the Border Region; (6) put into practice the San Min Chu I; (7) mobilize the people to protect the entire country, including the Border Region and north China; and (8) overthrow Japanese imperialism and the fifth column.

The Kuomintang authorities, whose statements are paralleled by broadcasts emanating from Japanese radio stations in the occupied areas, claim that there is widespread dissension among the Communists (Embassy’s telegram No. 1240, July 21, 9 a.m. and No. 1256, July 22, 5 p.m.) who are said to have been split into three groups as a result of the dissolution of the Comintern. One group, led by Mao Tze-tung, is said to favor the continuation of the Party’s present policy; the second group, led by Wang Ming (the last Chinese representative on the Executive Committee of the Comintern who returned to China from Moscow at the end of 1937), is said to support a revolutionary policy; the third group, under the leadership of General Chou En-lai, is described by the Kuomintang as desirous of coming to terms with the Central Government by surrender of the Communist government and army.

Communist representatives at Chungking deny the charges of disunity in the Communist Party and state that, while the dissolution of the Comintern came as a surprise to the rank and file of the Party, it was not unexpected by the leaders. The Communists maintain that the Comintern has provided only moral support for several years and that all material assistance from Soviet Russia in the form of military supplies has for some years gone only to the Central Government. The Communists assert that the Kuomintang is utilizing the dissolution of the Comintern in order to create the impression that there is dissension in the Communist Party. The Communist representatives deny the accuracy of these stories and firmly assert that no such dissension exists. They point to the above-described circular telegram as evidence of the unity of the Chinese Communist Party.

In the report said to have been made by Mr. Mao Tze-tung at Yenan in regard to the dissolution of the Comintern (this report was not published in the local Communist newspaper), Mr. Mao asserts that the Comintern has extended considerable assistance to the three great revolutionary movements in China: the northern expedition, the land revolution and the anti-Japanese war. He refers to the assistance given by the Comintern to Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang in 1924 and calls attention to General Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to Moscow at that time and the presence of Kuomintang representatives at meetings of the Comintern.

Mr. Mao gives three reasons for the dissolution of the Comintern: (1) the complicated and rapidly changing conditions in different countries require a leadership which can be obtained through a careful study of local conditions. Such a study cannot be conducted by an international organization far removed from the scene of activity in the various countries. (2) A central organization such as the Comintern is inappropriate for the varying conditions found in countries both in the Fascist and anti-Fascist camps, as in both groups there are socialist, capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial entities. (3) the Communist Parties in the various countries have reached maturity. The ability of the Chinese Communist Party to stand alone is shown by the circumstance that since 1935 the Comintern has not interfered with internal questions of the Party. Mr. Mao continues that the dissolution of the Comintern is thus not for the purpose of weakening the Communist parties of the various countries but rather for the purpose of strengthening the parties in order to make them more nationalistic and more in conformity with the needs of the antifascist war. He adds that the disciplinary movement of the Communist Party has in recent years opposed subjectivism, sectarianism and party formalism in order to make the Party a national party in conformity with the needs of the war and of national reconstruction. Mr. Mao concludes with an appeal for unity, stating that there are two prerequisites: unity within the party and unity between the party and the people.

It is difficult to know where the truth lies between the charges made by the Kuomintang that the Communist Party has been severely shaken by the dissolution of the Comintern and the assertions of the Communists that their Party is firmly united both against the Japanese and against any attack from the Central Government. It seems probable that the dissolution of the Comintern has produced a psychological reaction among the Communists who may now feel that the Kuomintang believes itself to be in a position where it can move against the Communists without fear of too adverse a reaction from Soviet Russia. The final appeal of Mr. Mao Tze-tung in his above-described report points to the necessity of unity and, by implication, to some fear that complete unity does not exist. The Kuomintang may have assumed that Communist unity was so severely shattered that it could successfully attack the Border Region or that its exertion of pressure on the Communists could bring about Communist acceptance of terms favorable to the Central Government.

The Embassy has so far received no indications that the Communists are willing to accede to Kuomintang demands that the Communist Border Government and army be surrendered to the Central Government. There are indeed indications to the contrary, as shown by reports (Embassy’s telegram No. 1325, July 28, 6 p.m.) that there exist fears that the Communists may attempt to move west into Kansu Province within the next year. The struggle between the two parties thus seems likely to continue, and the situation shows no signs of being ameliorated through concessions on the part of either faction.

Unless the Chungking authorities feel that the present moment offers the most favorable opportunity for liquidation of the Communists or unless the Central Government control over the areas now under its authority should become so weakened through local dissension as to make any such areas susceptible to Communist propaganda or easy prey to Communist attack, it seems probable that the final settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist problem will be postponed until the end of the war.

A thorough settlement would on the one hand include the establishment by the Chungking leaders of representative government with participation therein by the Communist Party and on the other hand would include surrender by the Communists of their Border Government and army. Given the present temper of the Kuomintang leaders and the determination of the Communists not to make any important compromise which would deprive them of guarantees of their support (that is, their Border Government and army), prospects of such a settlement seem so remote as to be beyond the realm of possibility. Most observers are accordingly of the opinion that open and bitter hostilities are inevitable in the long run.²³

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

20. None printed.
21. These documents which have been furnished the Embassy by Communist representatives at Chungking, are received by radio from Yenan. The receiving set at Chungking is under the control of the 18th Group (8th Route) Army Headquarters. [Footnote in the original.]
22. These documents which have been furnished the Embassy by Communist representatives at Chungking, are received by radio from Yenan. The receiving set at Chungking is under the control of the 18th Group (8th Route) Army Headquarters. [Footnote in the original.]
23. See last footnote on p. 301.
22. Commanding Chinese troops on borders of Communist areas in Shensi.

23. In a memorandum dated September 27 Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Par Eastern Affairs commented: “Although the Chinese Communists do not practice Communism at present and although they state that the dissolution of the Comintern has ended their dependence upon Moscow, the following excerpt from enclosure no. 3 (statement released by the Communist Party on July 9 [May 26]) indicates that the Chinese Communists continue to regard (or profess to regard) Communism as an international force and as the ultimate desideratum for China:

    ‘Chinese Communists are Marx–Leninists. Marxism–Leninism is science which knows no state boundaries. The Chinese Communists will certainly continue to apply and develop Marxism–Leninism dialectically in accordance with our own conditions in order to serve the cause of resistance war and national reconstruction.’”