893.00/15070: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 23—3:37 p.m.]
1183. Embassy’s 1173, July 13, 4 p.m., and previous. A Counselor of Soviet Embassy together with a Press Attaché of the Embassy, who acted as interpreter, called on me this morning “to exchange views” in regard to the Kuomintang-Communist situation. From his remarks it appears that the information in possession of the Soviet Embassy on recent developments is similar to ours, except the Counselor stated that Central Government troops had within the last few days fired on Communist outposts or positions in as many as 10 different places. He expressed the opinion that Chinese Government by moving more forces to the “border” area were probably hoping to exert pressure on Communists to accept Generalissimo’s terms and that Government realized that it would not be desirable, from the point of view of China’s international relations, to launch military attack [Page 284] upon the Communist forces at this time. He expressed apprehension, however, lest civil war break out as a result of possible independent action by individual Central Government troop commanders and said that, according to his Embassy’s information, the situation along the “border” was “very tense”.
This approach by Soviet Counselor seems to us to be of interest, incidentally, because it is the first time within our recollection that Soviet Embassy has so unequivocally shown concern in the fortunes of Chinese Communists and because of the seriousness with which Soviet Embassy apparently regards the recent developments. We for our part are still of the opinion that Chinese Government is not deliberately planning to resolve the issue by resort to arms, but that there exists and will continue to exist so long as Central Government maintains large troop concentrations in the so-called “border area” a possibility that there may be precipitated some incident which conceivably might have very unfortunate results.
When occasion has arisen in private informal conversation with Chinese officials we have, of course, expressed the opinion that the outbreak of anything in the nature of a civil war in China would be most unfortunate; we do not, however, believe that it would be advisable or productive for us here to make any direct approach in the matter at this time. We have the impression that General Stilwell has endeavored for a long time to persuade the Chinese military authorities to move Hu Tsung-nan’s troops, which are considered to be among the best and the best equipped of the Chinese Army to Yunnan or some other area where they might contribute something to the war effort, but the Chinese Government (the Generalissimo and his reactionary supporters) have remained adamant and are and will continue to be relentless in their efforts to eliminate the Communist question if they can do so without forcing the issue to the extent of open hostilities. (There are now possibly more than 400,000 Central Government troops in the “border” area and while the region is, of course, an important sector of defense against possible Japanese attack, even Chinese Intelligence officers admit that the immobilization there of such large numbers of superior troops is not justified for that purpose alone.
I would venture the opinion that a possibly effective way of influencing the Chinese Government in this matter (as well as in other matters) would be to furnish China with considerably increased air and other military aid (if this is practicable) or categorically to promise additional and precisely specified aid at a fixed date, and at the same time make it clear that such aid is furnished in the definite expectation that the Chinese Government by appropriate use of its troops and other resources would launch itself with determination into the war against Japan.