740.0011 Pacific War/3206

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China ( Davies ) to General Stilwell 40

A Chinese friend arranged for me to call on General Feng Yuhsiang, the former war-lord and “Christian general”, now member of the Standing Committee of the National Military Council of which General Chiang Kai-shek is Chairman. My friend explained to me that Feng is the only prominent figure in the Government, with the possible exception of Sun Fo, who dares to be bluntly outspoken in his criticism of conditions in China when speaking to the Generalissimo. Feng’s verbal attacks on corruption and incompetence, he said, have earned him the enmity of other officials, both military and civil.

With the slight stoop and mental preoccupation of advancing age, Feng stalked into the room, a massive figure in his wadded jacket and trousers of blue cotton. He indulged in the old Chinese courtesies of [Page 34] referring to himself as “younger brother” and the United States as “your honorable country”. Gradually we got to an exchange of views.

He wants a supreme American-Chinese-Soviet command for the war against Japan. He reiterated this. His omission of Britain was pointed; his inclusion of the Soviet Union despite Russia’s neutrality gave him no pause. He demanded a supreme command for the war against the Japanese because, he said, the Burma experience taught us that we need one. The British doling out rice day by day as negotiated for, the haggling over who was in command—the Chinese, the Americans and the British each with his bids—was a disgraceful spectacle of buying and selling (tso mai mai). This type of bargaining must be replaced by a strong central command. Whether it be American, British or Chinese doesn’t matter, he roared, unity of direction is the important thing.

Feeling that we were getting slightly beyond my depth, I ventured a question about the post-war world. That elicited another blast. He was a simple soldier. His only interest was driving the Japanese devils from China back to the islands. He was not speculating on what should happen after that. We had to defeat the enemy first.

After this storm had subsided, we talked about American aid to China. He said that he realized that we were doing everything possible under the circumstances. He quoted by way of illustrating Chinese-American relations at this time a Chinese proverb to the effect that a man whose hand is caught between the upper and nether millstones is unreasonably impatient toward the man coming to his aid as fast as is humanly possible.

Feng questioned the necessity of our sending arms to China when, as he explained, China was producing more iron and steel than its arsenals and factories could use. It was his belief that we should send over several plane loads of engineers to assist the Chinese in turning the surplus iron and steel into matériel. He was particularly enthusiastic over the possibility of making large mortars which he said had been used by the Russians with great effect. This predilection for mortars may have its base in the demonstration you put on for him some years ago when you (General Stilwell)—according to the legend—constructed a formidable Stokes mortar for him from a piece of iron pipe.

Corruption in the Chinese Army was a topic which the General next introduced. He said that due to inflation and the custom of Army and divisional commanders taking a cut on pay allotted to their troops, Chinese divisions are now each one regiment below strength. They still draw pay for full divisions but pocket the allotment for the nonexistent regiments. The Government, he declared, has taken some action with regard to this abuse. The Commanding General of the Third Group Army apparently indulged in this practice to excess, [Page 35] for he was recently brought to Chungking, according to Feng, for questioning. Feng described this situation with manifest disgust, exclaiming, “That’s one of your allies!”

“We are allies”, Feng went on to say, “and we must be frank with one another. You must tell us our faults and recognize our good points.” He continued, “Now is no time to engage in exchange of polite phrases of false mutual esteem. We owe it to one another to be straightforward.” I observed that you had, as far as my information went, been frank with the Generalissimo and other Chinese leaders. Of course, I added, some people had been a little disturbed by straightforward talk. It was a difficult and delicate matter. Feng brushed aside these comments, reemphasizing the necessity for complete frankness.

Our mutual friend remarked that I had visited Ramgarh and added, “Mr. Davies says that the troops there have meat to eat every day!” I therefore described conditions at the Training Center, the teaching of practical exercises with live ammunition, the excellent equipment, the good clothing and the robust condition of the troops. Feng nodded approval and then rumbled, “Here, though, if you suggest that the troops should be properly fed and cared for when sick you are called a Communist.”

The Japanese had embarked upon a program, Feng stated, for the impressment of 10,000,000 Chinese troops (one of those typically picturesque figures of speech statistics to which the Chinese are prone) to be used eventually in the Southwest Pacific and other areas where they will be up against American rather than other Chinese troops. He said that several boatloads have already been sent to Japan and that officers are being trained in Nanking. He said that the American military authorities should secretly confer with the Chinese military authorities to devise means for dealing with this development.

The Central Government, our mutual friend declared, had lost contact with the Kiangsu Provincial Government. It was feared that the provincial leaders had gone over to the Japanese. This was being kept secret from us. It represented a serious set-back to Chungking. Other unfavorable developments were the defeat and surrender of the 128th Division (in the Fifth War Area?) and the decimation of Yu Hsueh-chung’s forces in Shantung.

Li Tsung-jen, Commander of the Fifth War Area, drew high praise from Feng. He described Li as the best Chinese general and an undoubted patriot. “There is not a person in China who does not regard Li with esteem”, Feng fervently declared. He was scarcely less complimentary about Pai Chung-hsi.

This was one of the most interesting conversations I have had in recent months. Feng is a most unusual character, as you well know, [Page 36] being a combination of shrewd peasant, high-handed warlord, Buddhist recluse, Methodist revivalist, communist internationalist and Chinese nationalist. His conversation was sometimes in the coarse, homely phraseology of the north China farmers, then it was in the form of precepts and moral homilies. At times he was detached, hardly seeming to be aware of my existence, again he was fervent and direct. He was alternately realistic and naive about international and military affairs. He was, however, like most Chinese, consistently anti-British.

John Davies
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in China (Vincent) in his covering despatch No. 1018, March 23; received April 16.