761.93/1725
The Consul at Tihwa (Clubb) to the Chargé in China (Atcheson)80
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 3, April 22, 194378 in regard to the movement of National Government troops into Sinkiang Province, and to report that the regiment of Soviet Russian troops heretofore established at Hami, and Russian military and economic advisers to the Sinkiang Provincial Government, are being withdrawn to the Soviet Union.
Summary: The withdrawal evidently comes in the first instance as a result of early Chinese initiative, but the Russian version has in it a suggestion that the extent of Russian withdrawal may come in [Page 250] part from a Russian decision. There are indications that present developments may not be ultimately uniformly beneficial to China. The original Chinese move appears to have been rooted in a belief that the U. S. S. R. would either succumb to, or be very seriously weakened by, German military action against the Russian Army. The present indications are that such belief may not be more valid in 1943 than it was in 1942, and that in fact future developments in Europe may leave the Soviet Union free to begin reconstruction and fresh production while China is still at war. China has in the past received benefits from barter agreements, which included the extension of credits to China, with the Soviet Union. The Chinese political, and economic, situations are alike such that it stands in need of much assistance still [sic]. One form of assistance desired by China is military action by the Soviet Union against Japan, others comprise transport facilities, technical assistance, and goods. It is not in any event likely that war will at present break out between Japan and the Soviet Union, unless one or the other feels that such a war is an ineluctable necessity. If the present developments in Sinkiang result from something in the nature of a political contest between China and the Soviet Union, it is only logical to anticipate that in future the Soviet Union may prove somewhat less inclined to be of assistance to China—even where it might be able to assist. This situation affects the United States, which in the first place is presumably desirous that the Soviet Union at least maintain a “cooperative” attitude vis-à-vis United Nations interests in the Pacific area, and which in the second place is now being looked to by China to supply goods not at present available from the Soviet Union—as well as other materials. It is to be concluded that the National Government’s current move may not be an unmixed good for either Sinkiang or China; that perhaps it would have been a more profitable approach, politically, if the National Government had approached the Sinkiang problem more carefully. End of summary.
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The situation affects the United States in more ways than one. It is presumably granted that it is in the ultimate interest of the United States, in the present circumstances, that the Soviet Union maintain an attitude which is at least “cooperative” vis-à-vis United Nations’ interests in the Pacific area. China’s policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and the consequences they bear for American interests in the Pacific, are therefore of direct concern to us for political reasons. It is to be noted in addition, however, that the Chinese side is evidently now inclined to rely upon the United States, to the exclusion of the Soviet Union insofar as possible, economically as well as politically. In the present circumstances, Chinese hopes of economic assistance from the United States cannot be fully realized, if for no other reason than lack of transport facilities. I believe it probable that the Sinkiang Provincial Government was told by Chungking leaders in 1942 that American goods would enter the province to take the place of the Russian goods now lacking. It nevertheless appears unlikely that electrical machinery, et cetera can be obtained from the United States by Sinkiang in the near future any more than from the [Page 251] Soviet Union. It is true that Sinkiang has not received any cotton-goods from the Soviet Union for the past year; however, interior China needs such textiles itself, and probably would not trans-ship any large amount to Sinkiang even if they were to be received from India or the United States. The basic premise of the Chinese side, by deduction that the Soviet Union is economically on its knees and that the United States is coming to the front with supplies of all categories for China, therefore places upon the United States an onerous burden which we have not sought and probably would not want in its entirety.
Long-term forecasts are admittedly not warranted under wartime conditions, where so many new—and often unexpected—events occur in rapid succession to change the general picture. It is further to be noted that the Chinese are moderately adept, in a myopic way, at trimming their sails to fit the political winds that blow, and they will probably endeavor to make adjustments as developments occur. In the light of recent developments, however, it should not be considered surprising if 1) Sinkiang’s currency, now linked with the Chinese national currency, with the opening of the economic door into interior China, should in due course reach the same low level of the currency inside the Wall; 2) there should occur in Sinkiang, instead of continued implementation of the provincial Three-Year Plan, a goods famine which in certain categories would be more severe than in interior China itself;* 3) the Soviet Union should in future prove somewhat less sympathetic and less helpful as regards those of China’s economic and political problems in respect to which it might be in a position to lend assistance; and 4) those elements of Chinese sympathy for the United States which are based upon misconceptions or unbalanced exaggerations should deteriorate or quite disappear when we fail—as seems inevitable—to perform fully the tasks the Chinese themselves have set up for us. It will be realized, of course, that the last-cited hypothetical development would in fact most probably leave Sino-American relationships on a firmer, healthier basis than at present.82
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in China in his covering despatch No. 1272, June 19; received July 15.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Sinkiang presumably will not undergo actual want in terms of food, rough native cloth, fuel, et cetera, unless the transport facilities of the National Government are developed to the point where drainage out of provincial products on a large scale becomes possible; however, the province needs machinery, cotton-goods, matches, cigarettes, sugar, medicines, and transport equipment. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- In a memorandum dated August 20 Mr. Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs invited attention to “the final paragraph of the Consulate’s despatch in which are recapitulated the possible effects for China and for the United States of China’s precipitate action to eradicate Russian influence in Sinkiang.” The memorandum was initialed by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine), who underscored the word “precipitate”.↩