893.00/15032

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 65

No. 1208

Sir: There is transmitted herewith a copy of a memorandum66 submitted by the Secretary on detail at Chengtu reporting a conversation of May 2, 1943, with Dr. C. W. Chang, Dean of the College of Agriculture and Forestry of the University of Nanking, in regard to general conditions in China. Prior to the conversation Dr. Chang had been in Chungking for a month during which time he talked with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and many other prominent Chinese officials.

Dr. Chang stated that the fiscal situation is the cause of great concern to the Central Government, for it can hope to raise no more than half of its budget of CN $36,000,000,000 through taxation. Opposition to the efforts of the Government to increase present taxes and impose new ones, together with the possibility of an increase in taxes being used by dissident elements to stir up trouble among the people, forces the Government to proceed cautiously.

With regard to the recent disturbances in Kweichow, Szechuan and Kansu (Embassy’s telegram No. 667, May 8, 10 a.m.), Dr. Chang expressed belief that they were instigated by powerful elements opposed to the Chinese Government. He pointed out that the Chinese people are becoming war-weary and disillusioned because of deteriorating internal conditions, the apparent lack of assistance from abroad and the apparent American and British policy of crushing Germany first and Japan afterwards. With the morale and spirit of the Chinese people at a low ebb, local political groups, seeking personal gain and power, appear to be inciting the people to oppose the Central Government and to be causing local unrest. Dr. Chang expressed belief that the most important factor upon which depends the success of the Central Government in overcoming its present difficulties is this year’s harvest. Given unfavorable crops, the Central Government may find it impossible to maintain the unity and peace necessary to continue the war.

[Page 242]

In the international field, Dr. Chang outlined the attitude of the Chinese toward the other major powers, asserting that the former consider the United States to be the only real friend China has among the world powers. Great Britain and Soviet Russia are viewed with suspicion and the Generalissimo’s plans for the development of the Northwest arise partly from suspicion of Soviet Russia and the desire to establish a bulwark against possible Soviet menace.

The informant includes the Chinese Communist Party among the elements seeking to discredit and destroy the Kuomintang and the Central Government. He stated that they now control parts of Shansi, Shensi, Hopei, Shantung and Kiangsu and that their eventual aim after the defeat of Japan is to extend their control to Manchuria. He charged that the Communists are now cooperating with Wang Ching-wei in endeavoring to expel General Han Teh-chin and his Central Government troops from northern Kiangsu. He was of the opinion that the Communist system of land tenure will alienate the support of the local populace in North China and that with the lack of that support they cannot remain in control of that area.

The Embassy concurs with the general thesis of the above described conversation and feels that there is an increasing awareness among the Chinese of the strain of six years of war with its concomitant of rising prices, a steadily deteriorating economic and financial situation and a feeling that the China war theater has been completely subordinated to other war zones with respect to any appreciable military aid from the United Nations. The roots of the unrest in various parts of Free China are chiefly economic and it has not been difficult for dissident elements to take advantage of the opportunity to spread disaffection. The instigators have thus been both those provincial elements which have long resented the encroachment of the Central Government and Japanese and puppet agents who are motivated by a desire to destroy the Chungking Government. The Chinese Communists are convinced that, in view of the anticipated efforts of the Kuomintang to seek the liquidation of the Communist Party and its army through negotiations or by force at the first favorable opportunity, their role vis-à-vis the Kuomintang can never be that of a legal minority party with participation in the Government (Embassy’s despatch No. 1179 of May 1367). It would be surprising, therefore, if the Communist Party failed to utilize opportunities to undermine the Kuomintang, but it does not necessarily follow that the Chinese Communists would cooperate with puppet elements in order to overthrow the Central Government. The Communists would have nothing to gain from the cessation of organized resistance to Japan which would result from a capitulation by the Chungking Government, [Page 243] and the Communists are not sufficiently strong in numbers or in equipment to force the issue with the Central Government.

Conflicting reports continue to reach the Embassy with regard to the attitude of the people in north China toward the Communist Party and its policies. Some Chinese and the majority of foreign observers who have lived in or passed through that area depict favorably the attitude of the local populate toward the Communists and Communist activity in that area (Embassy’s despatches No. 996 of March 15 and No. 1042 of April 2)68 and state that Communist forces are much more active in guerrilla operations than Central Government troops. Other Chinese harbor a deep-grained suspicion of the Communists and criticize them for their policy of land confiscation and treatment of the Chinese people. It is difficult to reconcile the two divergent views, but in any estimate of the Communist position and the Chinese attitude toward the question there is to be considered the accumulated effect of years of Kuomintang propaganda against the so-called “red bandits” and the natural suspicion which exists with regard to Communism.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
  1. Copy sent to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Neither printed.