I may take the opportunity of my early return to Washington to comment
further upon the potential situation described in the enclosure.
[Enclosure]
The Second Secretary of Embassy in China
(Drumright)
to the Chargé in China (Vincent)
[Extract]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General situation. Within the past few months and
especially during the past two months there has been a serious
deterioration in the general situation. As you know there have been
uprisings in Kweichow which appear at least in part to be directed
against the National Government. In Kansu banditry is rampant and
apparently spreading. In Honan there is one of the worst famines that
China has experienced within the past fifty years. In Szechuan, the hub
of Chinese resistance, there is great uneasiness and tension and there
have been small uprisings and an increase in banditry. Down at the front
there is very little activity; malnutrition is apparently prevalent
[Page 234]
among the troops, sickness is
increasing, and the spirit of the troops is said to be flagging.
Guerrilla activity is but a name. In the occupied areas the Japanese
with a few hundred troops are able to sit behind their elaborate
fortifications and contain thousands if not hundreds of thousands of
idle Chinese troops.
Inflation is one of the chief cankers eating at the heart of the Chinese
will to go on. It is probably true that the merchant, agricultural and
laboring classes are not irretrievably affected by this force, but
inflation seems to be destroying the morality of the country, sapping
the spirit of the people. The lack of a clear-cut economic policy in
Chungking has added to the ills. Half-hearted attempts to control prices
and to enforce the rationing system have threatened to upset the
economic equilibrium of the country, stimulate black markets, interfere
with production, and bring about higher rather than lower prices. And
then, of course, there is the fiscal problem which must be very serious
and growing even more so, with the issuance of additional bank notes as
the only means of filling the breach.
It goes without saying that the Chinese are heartily sick of the war,
that they want it to be over as soon as possible. It seems very obvious
that they are disillusioned by what has happened since Pearl Harbor.
They thought that would mean quick defeat for Japan whereas in fact
their lot has been made more difficult in some respects. Surveying their
own internal problems which are legion and growing ever more complex and
serious, they are beginning to wonder whether they will be able to hold
together until Japan is defeated. They are driven to despair when they
admit to themselves that the war against Japan must go on for another
three or four years—a period that seems an age to a people who have
already endured the vicissitudes of war for six years, a people who have
exchanged manpower and space for time. But the sands seem to be running
out and unless there is a stimulus injected from some direction the will
to fight on may collapse in the ruin of the political and economic
machine that has enabled China to fight on thus far.
The Chinese, in desperate straits as they are, are not encouraged by the
thought that an Allied victory in Europe is a common victory in which
they share. And they are most certainly not encouraged by the slowness
with which they feel that the European campaign is proceeding. They of
course want more action against Japan and they want it soon. They may
want it in order to take Japanese pressure off their backs (which is in
fact more pressing from an economic and financial position than from a
military point of view), but I believe that they want decisive action
against Japan in the near future because they feel inwardly that they
cannot go on supporting the war in even its present relatively quiet
atmosphere very much longer.
[Page 235]
The Chinese are not only driven to pessimism and despair by the policy
of despatching Hitler first, but also because of the seeming lack of
concrete assistance given to China at this time. Speeches such as that
made not long ago by Prime Minister Churchill do incalculable harm; they
tend to shatter the spirit and morale of the Chinese people and such
utterances, worse still, tend to cause the Chinese people to have less
confidence in their leaders.
I believe that the Chinese people still have faith in the United States,
in the utterances of President Roosevelt. They believe even yet that the
United States will come to their rescue. But it is a matter for
speculation as to how long they will continue to feel that way. As you
know, the Chinese people as a whole—those who are articulate—have no
confidence and faith in the policies and attitudes of Great Britain and
Churchill; they feel that Britain fears the rise of a strong China,
wants China to remain in a semi-colonial status; they believe that
Britain will continue its colonial policy after the war. That feeling on
the part of the Chinese people is, if anything, fostered by most Chinese
leaders not excepting the Generalissimo himself. There is also an
abiding distrust of the Soviet Union prevalent in official and private
circles, a distrust abetted by the thorny problem of the Chinese
communists now astride of North China and possibly in a position to join
hands with the Soviet Union by way of Manchuria if and when Japan
collapses. It is an open secret that all this activity looking to the
development of the northwest is not based on sound economic policy. The
chances are about nine to one that the northwest will not sustain much
economic development for the resources to justify large-scale
developments do not appear to exist. The real reason for all the
activity centered around the economic development of the northwest is
political. The Generalissimo, looking to the future, apparently feels
that it is necessary to build a barrier in the northwest to stop
possible Soviet incursions. He may need such a barrier before he can
undertake the work of clearing the Chinese communists from northeast
China if that becomes necessary.
Getting back to the United States and its policy toward China, it seems
to me that we should make a special effort to rejuvenate Chinese morale.
The quickest way to do that is to increase our air power out here—if
that is possible—and to hit the Japanese hard from the air. Another way
to stimulate Chinese morale would be to recover Burma, but that has
rather more long-range implications. We need to do something now. We
should also, I believe, encourage the Chinese in every way possible to
feel that we are coming to their rescue as
[Page 236]
soon as we can, that we are exerting every effort
to crush Japan as soon as possible. As I said above, the best way to
demonstrate our good faith is to do it right here in China. The Chinese
are glad to see us win victories in the Pacific and off Australia, but
they are now tired and not so rational as they might be. They want
something done here. If we could come in with powerful air support and
create havoc among the Japanese and their installations, it would, I
believe, revive the drooping morale of the Chinese. But even more
important it would, I believe, revive their confidence in their leaders
and probably put an end to the threatened defections of the sectional
warlords and politicians who, believing that the opportunity is ripe,
are apparently beginning to stir up and incite the people. This is a
trend that will have to be stopped if we wish China to continue
organized resistance to Japan, and we can play a large part in
suppressing the secret ambitions of the warlords who place personal
aggrandizement and gain above everything and who would bring back the
reign of anarchy that existed after the downfall of the Manchu Dynasty.
I realize that what I have said above is couched in a very pessimistic
vein, but I feel very strongly that it reflects the present trend of
events in this country. I do not wish to go on record as predicting that
the Chiang Kai-shek regime will collapse tomorrow; it will probably be
able to carry on for some time yet barring a widespread famine. But I do
feel that the seeds of disintegration have been planted, that we should
recognize that fact and the serious implications it holds for the United
States and the other United Nations and that we should do all within our
power—as we may be doing for all I know—to encourage and support the
Chinese people and the Chiang Kai-shek government.
[Here follows report on unrest in Szechuan and Sikang and opposition of
provincial military leaders to growth of authority of the National
Government.]
Cordially yours,
