893.00/15007: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Vincent) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:37 a.m.]
654. Chou En-lai, representative at Chungking of the Chinese Communist Party, called and ensuing conversation developed the following:
Negotiations carried on intermittently for the past half year for settlement between the Kuomintang and the Communists are at a standstill. Lin Piao, Communist General who came to Chungking at the Generalissimo’s invitation in November, is still here awaiting some kind of settlement which it does not appear will be forthcoming (it is not improbable that Lin Piao may be remaining involuntarily). Chou states that Communists have agreed in principle to reduction of their forces and to their concentration in areas north of the Yellow River but have pointed out, with regard to the latter point, the practical impossibility of transferring troops from isolated areas through Jap held territory, and the ill effects of withdrawing their troops from areas which Kuomintang forces are not prepared to occupy. [Page 231] General Ho Ying-chin has informed Chou that, since the National Government made these two requirements some years ago, circumstances have changed and that the situation must be reconsidered. Communists continue to put forward their four points involving Communist cooperation in struggle to realize principles of San Min Chu I; National Government recognition of right of Communists to participate in the war and in the Government and legalization of local government’s setup in Communist areas; support of Communist armies to enable them actively to fight Japan; and free cooperation now and after the war among all parties under a National Government dedicated to democracy and reconstruction. Kuomintang officials here insist that undefined general principles must be agreed upon before these Communist desiderata can be considered. This is how the matter now stands and, I think, will continue to stand for some time to come. I do not consider, and Chou concurs in this view, that there is any imminent likelihood of an outbreak of civil war; but the determination of Kuomintang leadership, probably stronger now than a year ago, to liquidate the Communists continues to be a sure barrier to cooperation. The very objective of the negotiations, from the standpoint of the Kuomintang, is the elimination of the Communists as a force in China and if this elimination cannot be accomplished through negotiations an attempt will be made when what may be considered a propitious moment arrives to effect it by force.
Chou does not anticipate any radical alteration in the situation between Soviet Union and Japan although he feels that the Russians may attack the Japs when they are freed from the German threat. He is anxious that American military and competent civilian observers proceed to guerrilla areas in the north to make studies of the area with a view to preparation for eventual air and land action against the Japs. He envisages such action as coordinated with eventual Russo-Jap hostilities and expresses hope that the Chinese might be able to move through North China into southern Manchuria. He also speaks of the need of Chinese preparations to advance in the Yangtze Valley (against Ichang and Hankow) and further south to take advantage of a hard pressed Japan when an anticipated all out American naval offensive commences. He believes that the Chinese have and can produce, with internal natural and industrial resources, sufficient supplies to carry out limited offensives with little aid, other than aerial, from outside. He deplores present virtual military inactivity in China and speaks regretfully and reproachfully of the lack of offensive spirit shown by the Kuomintang leaders.