761.93/1718

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Dooman)44

I called on the Chinese Ambassador45 yesterday to pay my respects on his appointment and assumption of his duties. We had an extended conversation, which was continued today when he returned my call, and for purposes of convenience the two conversations are combined in this memorandum as follows:

The Ambassador informed me that he had been for some time Acting Foreign Minister, for the reason that Mr. Soong, the actual Foreign Minister, had spent a great deal of his time abroad, mostly in the United States. He referred to the fact that I was shortly leaving the Soviet Union to return to the Department, and he said that he wished to speak quite frankly to me in the hope that I would convey his observations to my Government.

[Page 219]

[Here follows report of remarks on Soviet agreement as to supply route through the Soviet Union to China as reported in telegram No. 183, March 19, 5 p.m., page 600.]

The Ambassador said that he wished now to tell me quite frankly that the Chinese Government was somewhat concerned over the extent of the help which China might expect after the war toward coping with the enormous task of reconstruction. It has been obvious that China would be unable with its own resources after the war to rehabilitate itself. He wondered whether it would be possible for China to deal directly with private American interests with a view to securing necessary funds for rehabilitation and whether such funds could be expected without there being imposed on China the incubus of a banking consortium such as that which was set up after the last war.46 I replied that, without underestimating the seriousness of the task of rehabilitating China, it was my opinion that the problem was relatively more simple in China, with its predominantly agricultural economy, than in the case of highly industrialized nations which had been overrun and devastated by the war, such as Belgium. I further expressed the opinion that the days of the free exportation of capital from the United States had passed, and that I expected that there would be after the war a rigid supervision by the Government of all American funds desired for investment or other use in foreign countries. The Chinese Ambassador replied that he was greatly relieved by the opinion which I had expressed, but he wondered whether that opinion was generally held. I replied smilingly that I had a great many friends in New York who had expressed horror over the possibility of governmental control over the movement of capital, whether internally or externally, but that nevertheless I felt that I had no more than indicated the general trend of opinion in the United States.

The conversation then turned to the question whether the cooperation of the Soviet Union with the other members of the United Nations after the war could be confidently expected. The Ambassador said apropos that he wished to inform me in strict secrecy of certain apprehensions which were entertained by the Chinese Government with regard to possible future developments in the Far East. Assuming that the Soviet Union would join the other United Nations, after the defeat of Germany, in the operations looking toward the defeat of Japan—and that was merely an assumption—one would have to envisage the presence of considerable numbers of Soviet troops not only in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia but also in Manchuria, It would have to be expected that these Soviet forces would be disposed to support the Chinese Communist elements in their opposition [Page 220] to the Central Government of China, and he was frank to admit that a combination of that character would be extremely difficult for the Chinese Government to eliminate from the areas which he had mentioned. I expressed surprise that he had included Manchuria in that area, and asked whether it was the view of the Chinese Government that the aspirations of the Czarist regime in Manchuria had been inherited by the Soviet Government. The Ambassador replied that without attempting to answer my question directly he need only observe that the Soviet army in Siberia would undoubtedly succeed in making its way into Manchuria sooner than the Chinese army could work its way toward Manchuria from the south. Once the Soviet forces occupied Manchuria he thought it would be extremely difficult to move them out. I recalled that in a recent conversation with Mr. Liu, the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy here, I had urged the importance to China of retaining such undeveloped areas as Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria for the reason that as the standard of living of the Chinese people rose these areas would have to be counted on to produce foodstuffs and other necessities which a higher standard of living required. The Ambassador said that that was a point which had not failed to receive considerable attention on the part of the Chinese Government. The position in Sinkiang had of late been considerably improved by the recent adherence to the Central Government of the Sinkiang war lord47 (whose name I did not catch). He said that this General had recently completely changed his colors and was strongly opposed to the further incursion into his area of Soviet influence. It appears that he had recently imprisoned several hundred Chinese who had been collaborating with the Soviet Union. Although the hold of the Russians in Outer Mongolia was very strong, the Chinese Government had not yet abandoned hope of re-extending its influence over that area. Returning to the problem of Sinkiang, the Chinese Ambassador said that he had recently remarked to Mr. Vincent, Counselor of the American Embassy at Chungking, that the Chinese Government would have no objections whatever to the establishment of an American Consulate at Urumchi. He said that he did not know whether Mr. Vincent had acted on this suggestion, but hoped that when I returned to Washington I would inform the Department of the eagerness of the Chinese Government to see the American Government maintain representatives in the capital of Sinkiang Province.

In connection with the question of Chinese interests in western China, the Ambassador made further statements of an extremely confidential nature which he desired that I bring to the attention of the Secretary and of Mr. Hornbeck.

  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 274, March 25; received April 24.
  2. Foo Ping-sheung.
  3. For China Consortium Agreement, signed October 15, 1920, see Foreign Relations, 1920, vol. i, p. 576.
  4. Gen. Sheng Shih-tsai.