893.20/781
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Davies) to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)30
The Stilwell Mission
General Stilwell came to China in February 1942 with a directive from the President to keep China in the war and to do everything possible to increase China’s military contribution to the joint struggle against the Axis.
A fundamental difficulty which faces General Stilwell is that China’s policy in the prosecution of this war is not always parallel to ours.
[Page 26]All informed Chinese are keenly aware that of the four principal members of the United Nations, China has suffered the longest and the greatest in this conflict. Furthermore like the Russians and the British, the Chinese have a more highly developed political sense than we. Political considerations loom larger in their evaluation of situations (including the military situation) than they do for even the Russians and the British.
Acutely aware of their relative military exhaustion, of the fact that they can be no stronger politically than they are militarily, of the importance of appearing as powerful as possible at the peace table and of the likelihood of civil war with the Chinese communists after the peace, the Chinese Government is, not surprisingly, pursuing a policy of conservation of military strength. The Japanese approach the truth when they accuse the Chinese of seeking to make the far (the United States) fight the near (Japan).
We recognized before December 7, 1941 that China was endeavoring to get us to fight its battle against Japan. There has been no reason for a change in this Chinese attitude and there has in fact been no change, despite the disillusioning shock of Pearl Harbor which struck the Chinese with as great force as it did us.
China’s policy, now that we are fighting the Japanese, is to remain technically in the war so as to be able to sit at the peace table as a “fighting” ally, to expend as little as possible of its strength and to rely upon the other members of the United Nations—primarily the United States—to defeat Japan.
We have not bled enough for the liking of the Russians, the British or the Chinese. With political considerations looming so large in their calculations they are each fighting not only the common enemies but also, in a negative fashion, their allies.
A second fundamental difficulty confronting General Stilwell is that, in addition to his professional military task, he is involved, whether he likes it or not, in Chinese domestic politics. He is a major force in Chinese politics. By instinct, temperament and convictions, he seeks to avoid involvement in Chinese domestic politics. But the fact that he commands a military force in China, is empowered to issue orders in the Generalissimo’s name and has under his control lend-lease matériel for distribution to China makes him, despite all of his wishes to the contrary, a Chinese political factor. While he endeavors to avoid playing domestic politics, he cannot prevent politics from being played on him.
In his efforts to short-circuit domestic politics, General Stilwell has as much as possible dealt directly with the Generalissimo. But the Generalissimo maintains his paramount position as he attained it—through political manipulation. He is not a dictator. He has no [Page 27] absolute over-all command. He manipulates a delicate and shifting balance of power. So there is no one with sure and final authority with whom General Stilwell can deal.
General Stilwell has, of course, had long-standing contact with the Chinese Army. What he discovered upon his arrival at Chungking was therefore no surprise to him. The Chinese Army is not an army in the sense that we use the word army. Rather it is an agglomerate of feudalistic military forces held more or less together by personal loyalties, endowments, grants in aid, threats of superior weight and indifferent toleration. The Generalissimo’s relation to this armed mass is variable. A few divisions he can count upon to obey his orders fairly faithfully, within the limits of their ability. Others, no. He wisely does not attempt to issue to some of the more independent commanders orders which he has reason to believe they would not be willing to obey. Many orders are issued only after negotiation with the commander or his Chungking representative.
The following comment by an exceptionally intelligent Chinese Army officer reveals a good deal with regard to the Chinese scale of military values. We were discussing possible candidates for the command of the Chinese Army at Ramgarh. I mentioned General Sun, Commander of the 38th Division, an unusually capable officer (I knew he would not be acceptable, but was interested in what reply would be given). It was this—”General Sun is too young, he belongs to no strong faction and has no political history.”
The Chinese Army is not only badly organized and, as everyone knows, poorly equipped but is also meagrely trained. This has shown up glaringly at Ramgarh. From privates on up, with exceptions like General Sun.
Excepting for the Communist divisions and the small body of troops at Ramgarh, the morale of the Chinese Army is low. It is characterized by (1) apathy and (2) venality.
The Chinese Army Officers have no great interest in fighting the Japanese. Even at Ramgarh there is some evidence of this. A Chinese-speaking American officer there who has constant contact with Chinese officers expressed surprise that not one of his Chinese colleagues (many of whom had homes occupied by the Japanese) had expressed a desire to get into the field and fight the Japanese. In China, the situation is worse.
Venality in the Chinese Army goes along naturally with the apathy, Chinese troops have traditionally had to shift for themselves. Most units have lived off the localities in which they have been stationed. This situation has further deteriorated in most regions bordering Japanese-occupied territory. Chinese commanders in these areas have settled down with their wives and families and gone into trade. They [Page 28] control and profit enormously from the contraband traffic across the “fighting” lines.
For example, a British sabotage unit in Hunan sought to destroy a bridge between the lines and over which the Chinese and Japanese were trading. When the Chinese commander heard of the project, he ordered the British out, suggesting that they go and fight their own war—everything was peaceful and harmonious there and the British wanted to start trouble. At Hokow on the Yunnan–Indochina border there is lively traffic between Chinese and Japanese-held territory, a certain number of ferries moving across the dividing river between certain hours. The Chinese garrisons draw their rice rations from Japanese territory. One morning late in January the rice ration failed to arrive during the scheduled trips. The Chinese commander became incensed and entered a strongly worded protest. The Japanese, not wishing to disrupt relations, obligingly dispatched the rations by a special ferry after hours.
These are samples chosen at random of the state of affairs at the front. The Japanese are as corrupt as the Chinese. The difference, however, is that the Japanese can be depended upon to fight when the orders come from the top. Corruption has not yet enervated them.
Summing up, in seeking to carry out the directive given him, General Stilwell is confronted with a basic reluctance on the part of the Chinese Government to assume the offensive against Japan, (2) a Chinese inclination to rely upon the United States to defeat Japan, (3) a Chinese desire to conserve matériel rather than expend it, (4) attempts by Chinese political factions to use him, (5) the absence of central Chinese authority, whether individual or collective, with whom he can deal, (6) lack of organization, political factionalism, incompetence, apathy and corruption in the Chinese army.
It would be naive in the extreme to suggest that all he has to do to make China an aggressive factor in the war against Japan is to place lend-lease arms in Chinese hands and in consultation with the Generalissimo issue orders for the attack.
All he can do, in fact, is argue, plead and bargain, with lend-lease matériel and the Ramgarh project as the inducements to follow his lead. The Chinese want the matériel, for that is the stuff of power. And the Chinese generals who have seen Ramgarh want the troops trained there for their personal armies. General Ho Ying-chin31 who was initially chilly to the Ramgarh project has since his visit there displayed signs of covetousness. General Stilwell can and is using these ambitions to compel the Chinese to prepare to assume the offensive against the Japanese.
[Page 29]But the Chinese can be expected to take the offensive only when they are assured that such a venture will be profitable, that what they expend in the way of matériel will be replaced, and with interest. That is one of the costs of an ally. The arrangement is a bargain. And we must continue, through control of the flow of lend-lease equipment, to be in a position to cut off the flow when the Chinese fall down on the fulfillment of their side of the bargain.
It follows that the intemperate eulogies of the Chinese Army which appear in the American press and over the American air (largely inspired by the Chinese pressure groups in the United States and uninformed American sinophiles) only play into the hands of the Chinese factions wishing to obtain lend-lease equipment without restrictions as to its use (or non-use). It is scarcely necessary to note that any one whom the Chinese might suggest as a replacement of General Stilwell would be likely to be a man whom the group in power in Chungking believed they could use to their own advantage. In feeling this way the Chinese are neither contemptible nor vicious—merely political.
Chinese and Americans have criticized General Stilwell for getting on badly with the Chinese. General Stilwell is not a man who willingly compromises. He has not concealed from the Chinese what he thinks of their incompetence and corruption. Naturally many of them have thereby been offended.
My reaction to this criticism is this. The Chinese Army and Government is ridden by politics and abuses. Any American military man who attempted to compromise and play Chinese politics would promptly find himself enmeshed and rendered useless for the purpose he was sent out. General Stilwell once said to me that “My safest course is straight down the road”. I am inclined to agree. The Chinese Army is not going to be made to fight the Japanese by wheedling and open-handed grants of matériel.
China is badly in need of the Puritan spirit. The Chinese have not produced it themselves excepting, in a modified form, in the Generalissimo. If the Chinese Army is to be regenerated, it must be through General Stilwell. What he says sometimes stings the Chinese. But it has not gone wholly unappreciated. More than a score of high-ranking Chinese officers have come to him privately telling him that he was doing China a great service by his forthrightedness, that he is needed, and to keep on going straight down the road. And as has been said, even his political enemies have been impressed by what he has in six months produced at Ramgarh. He may yet perform what has seemed impossible—cause the launching of a Chinese offensive against the Japanese. If it happens it will have been a one man achievement.